Earthly life

At the end of his life, Plotinus turned his attention from intellectual sphere to the affairs of human life, beginning with the old question of what it meant to live well. The problem Plotinus found in e.g. Aristotelian definition of good life as full actualisation of life was that it applied even to animals and even plants, which certainly actualised their own specific life goals. Plotinus’ solution was to suggest that there was a hierarchy of different types of life and only the form involving higher intellectual awareness was truly perfect. Thus, gods and even humans could be said to live well, but not mere animals or plants.

An important part of Plotinus’ understanding of good life was that it concerned only the mental side or personality of a human being. Body, he said, was no true part of human being and therefore had no effect on how good one’s life was. Thus, poverty, bad health or old age were no obstacles for good life, according to Plotinus. Even the lack of awareness was nothing to care about, since mere existence of good soul was enough for good life - after all, a good general is a good general, even when she is asleep.

A natural question is then why corporeal world is needed at all and equally natural suggestion is that it is just as mistake or even a creation of some malignant entity. Yet, Plotinus was not willing to move in that direction. Instead, he thought that the corporeal world is at least partly due to necessity - intellectual world cannot be the end of the development, but its energy is so great that it must produce something beyond itself. This product is undoubtedly lesser than its origin, Plotinus said.

Despite its imperfection, world still has beauty in itself, and it is governed by an entity, which should be an image of self-thinking intellect and non-corporeal soul. Plotinus compared this world governing entity to a dramatist, using both light and dark colours to create the drama of the world. In this drama, all persons have an important part, whether they are heroes or villains. And it is just a drama, in the sense that humans just move through it, assuming other roles at other times, which makes death and worldly sufferings nothing truly serious.

This world plan does still not take away human responsibility, Plotinus noted. Indeed, the true personality or soul of a human being belongs to a level above the plan of the world. Thus, a human soul is not completely under the world plan and is therefore accountable for her actions.

Once again, then, Plotinus emphasised the mediating role of human soul. Soul, for Plotinus, is characterised by logos, something mediating between perception, awareness of things outside oneself, in the corporeal world, and awareness of oneself. This self-awareness is actually twofold, Plotinus noted. Firstly, soul is aware of itself as logos, that is, as something directed to both outside and within itself. Secondly, it can also become aware of itself as a mere pure self-awareness. At this moment soul actually becomes one with the higher level in hierarchy, the intellect. Soul can so become aware of itself as being dependent of this pure self-awareness - as a sort of reflection of its light.

Pyrrhonists had argued that self-awareness was in a sense impossible - the self that was aware was always something different of what it was aware of and thus both of them were just parts of the whole self. Plotinus denied this and forcefully stated that pure self-awareness must be a simple unity, in which the whole intellect knows the whole intellect, even though this simple self-awareness does then have many aspects within it.

Since pure self-awareness has this aspect of differentiation and multiplicity in it, pure unity, as we should know by now, was then for Plotinus something above all self-awareness. Indeed, one could really not say anything about it, since a statement like “primordial unity is something that exists” still assumes a sort of distinction, when it distinguishes existence from this unity. Despite not being characterised by anything, it is still the source of everything - the original light, which the soul can reach only by losing everything else and merging itself with it.

Just like in the beginning of his career, Plotinus was still interested of the Platonic idea that love serves as a mediator leading individual soul to these higher levels of the hierarchy. In addition, Plotinus was interested of Plato’s mythological notion that, firstly, this love appeared in the form of a divine or daemonic entity, Eros, and secondly, that like Afrodite, Eros appeared also in two forms, as divine and earthly Eros. Plotinus suggested that Afrodite in this myth referred to soul - either the pure or embodied soul - and that there really were concrete entities serving as a connecting links between individual souls and intellectual world.

Although his gaze was always directed to what is good and what might be even more perfect than goodness, Plotinus admitted also that badness is also necessary. The primordial unity projects self-thinking intellect, intellect projects souls and souls finally project matter, which is the ultimate source of badness in the world. Matter exists in a sense, but only as a mere shadow of what properly exists. When souls become enamoured of this shadow existence, their powers diminish. Badness of souls is still not ultimate badness, because they still retain the capacity to clear themselves from the clutches of matter. Even embodied souls can find some of their powers and be able to resist the lure of matter. Still, such a virtuous life is not the ultimate perfection for soul, because it presupposes the fallen state of the soul.

Individual human being, Plotinus said, is then partly just a link in the corporeal, but also living universe. As such a link, an individual is open to the influence of corporeal objects, such as stars - and this is partly why astrology works, Plotinus thought. Yet, he also emphasised, individual is partly able to affect his own destiny and to make one’s own fate either better or worse. This duality of freedom and necessity is reflection of essential duality of what humans are. Firstly, we are pure souls, at most using bodies as tools, but secondly, we are also animals, or animated bodies. In other words, by invigorating body and making it alive, something new is created - first, perceptions, and then, organic processes.

One task of souls in Plotinian hierarchy was then to enliven the otherwise inert matter and connect it with the higher levels of the hierarchy. In this sense, embodied life was good, and there was no need to get rid of it. Indeed, Plotinus noted, true perfection on every level arose not from any striving toward some goal, but out of stillness and from mere existence as such. By this Plotinus did not want to say that e.g. dying is a bad thing. Instead, he pointed out that death was a liberation of soul from its corporeal duties and return to a pure state, from which it had descended.

Origin of Christian metaphysics

Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian symbolised in a sense two possible roads that Christian philosophy could have taken. Former related positively to pagan philosophy and thought it a possible source for the enlightenment of Christians. He was a clear Platonist, who accepted the idea of an immaterial soul. Latter, on the other hand, was not convinced of pagan philosophy, thinking more about the charismatic experiences of pure believers. If any philosophy was near to his heart, it was Stoicism, where he appropriated the idea of a material soul and a material divinity. In the end, it was the road of Clement of Alexandria which was chosen, while Tertullian’s rigoristic and materialistic thought was left out of the official creed of the church.

Like many early Christian thinkers, Origen made considerable efforts to understand what Bible was saying. Indeed, he considered exegesis of scripture as more worthy of scholarly attention than philosophical research. While thinkers like Tertullian had been very literal in their readings of the Bible, Origen followed the example of Philo of Alexandria and saw biblical stories more as a metaphor. Tales of Old Testament implied in his eyes truths revealed more openly in the New Testament. Thus, the tale of Isaac being saved from a sacrificial death by the appearance of a lamb showed for Origen that even early Israelites were convinced that human death would one day be vanquished by the seeming death of Logos.

Origen also thought that these stories were parables about proper human life. Thus, the story of Abraham fooling a king by introducing his wife, Sarah, as his sister, showed according to Origen that a righteous person (Abraham) can share virtuous life (Sarah) with other people. Similarly, the story of Egyptians selling their land voluntarily to Pharaoh at the time of famine was in Origen’s eyes a warning about weak persons willingly debasing themselves under the yoke of Devil.

The allegorical method of reading Bible pertained not just to stories, but also to laws about the Jewish rituals - for instance, the various sacrificial commands were signs of the sacrifice of Jesus. Indeed, the story how Moses could not enter the promised land, while his follower Joshua - or Jesus, as it was written in the translations of Old Testament at the time - did, was in Origen’s eyes a proof that Jewish law in its literal sense was not enough for salvation, unlike Christianity.

Not just the Old Testament, but also New Testament was not to be read too literally, according to Origen. For instance, Origen thought that the story of Jesus discoursing with Moses and Elijah and afterwards reproaching Peter for suggesting the construction of separate huts for the three was a parable about not separating Jewish law and prophets from gospels.

Although Origen’s interpretation of Jewish rituals as mere symbols of more spiritual events was quite in line with the ideas of first Christians, few of his spiritual readings obscured some tendencies of gospels. For instance, when gospels presented Jesus preaching that one should give money to the poor and not to those who already had riches, Origen suggested that this saying actually meant that we should teach especially those who were spiritually poor, that is, had misconceptions about God and his relation to humans.

With this rather imaginative way to read the Bible, Origen quickly found reasons to appreciate the philosophical tradition. When the Bible told of the skirmishes of Abraham with a king and his two companions and the final signing of peace treaty, this was for Origen a clear sign that the kingly discipline of logic with its two companions, physics and ethics, had battled with Christianity, but would finally find their peace with it. Indeed, one might even find some morsels of wisdom from texts of philosophers, just like Moses could learn something from his father-in-law who served another god.

Although Origen thus appreciated philosophy, he was quite adamant that church was of a much higher nature than any philosophical school. Indeed, although pagans might ridicule Christians for accepting things on faith, no philosophical school had managed to show that the others were wrong and their followers had to simply believe in their teachings. In addition, although Christianity was criticised for being based on mysteries, Origen thought that these mysteries were still much more common knowledge than esoteric teachings of philosophical schools, and indeed, they were mysteries only because understanding them required more effort.

Furthermore, despite the worth of other philosophical treatises, Bible contained in Origen’s opinion the core of philosophy in the form of Salomonic treatises. Salomon’s Proverbs indicated the ways of good life and the corrects method for using reason, thus covering ethics and logic. The essentials of physics, Origen said, were described in Ecclesiastes, which described the futility of all worldly things. Finally, the Song of Songs was to Origen a model for Platonic metaphysics, in which earthly love of a lover toward her beloved served as a symbol for the love leading a person toward the ultimate source of everything, or in religious terms, God.

This God should, according to Origen, be called the God, because to it the word “god” is most properly applied. Indeed, what names to be given for God was quite an important for Origen. Although pagan philosophers were happy to identify e.g. Zeus of Greek mythology with the creator of the universe, Origen thought that Zeus was at most some lesser entity trying to present itself as the highest being in the universe.

Against Tertullian, Origen noted that God must be immaterial, because all material objects need sustenance and cannot be eternal. Thus, whenever Bible ascribed a body to God or spoke of him as being made of some type of matter (e.g. pneuma or breath/spirit), this was just a metaphor. God is the ground of all life and it is figuratively called light, because it is devoid of any touch of impurity, and just like we never see the true light or Sun, but only its emissions, similarly, Origen suggests, we can be aware only of the effects of God’s power. Despite God being the most powerful being, Origen still thought that God’s powers had limits, because he thought all things must have their limits.

Because of its purity and goodness, Origen points out, God is only source of positive things, while he cannot be source of any negations. Thus, lack of goodness - in other words, evil - is not based on God. This still does not mean, Origen clarifies, that material world would not be work of God - even corporeal things have their own perfection. Indeed, God had made the world into an organic unity, in which all things were connected and eventually served the needs of rational beings.

God as such would be beyond human mind, but something called Logos could lead humans to the knowledge of God. Sometimes Origen seems to go even so far as to suggest that Logos is nothing else, but a name for the general capacity to know God - whatever this capacity or Reason is, it is for Origen definitely something higher than ordinary perception of earthly realities. When looked from another viewpoinr, Logos would be just the revelation or “word” of God about God itself and about the relation of other beings to God, since without the help of God humans could not truly know God. Still, at other places Origen makes it clear that Logos is a separate being - it is like a smaller model, through which the vastness of God can be represented.

This Logos, says Origen, has existed always, but is still dependent on God - Logos is like an image of God and always connected to its source. Although God and Logos are distinct, Origen says, they still are unified, just like a married couple is unified and still retain their individuality. Because of its close connection to God, Logos could also be called a God, although Logos certainly isn’t the God. Indeed, following the Gospel by John, Origen said that God has created everything else through Logos. Just like the God, Logos can also be called light, but it is not completely pure, but more like a spark emitted by the true source of light and a ray shining in darkness. That is, Logos can enter a state containing impurities - it can become embodied.

The purpose of the embodiment of Logos was, according to Bible, to perfect the work of God. This statement was somewhat problematic for Origen, since all works of God should be perfect. Origen’s solution was that due to some voluntary transgression a number of other entities had turned themselves away from God and thus become imperfect. The persons who now existed in the fallen state had originally existed in a different place - perhaps in immaterial fashion or perhaps in some more perfect region, with more perfect bodies, made out of the same substance as stars. Then, because of having become tainted by sin, they had been, as it were, thrown down to the earthly human existence. This falling could also be described figuratively as opening of their eyes, since it meant the beginning of sensory perception to these persons. Thus, they required Logos to perfect them, to cleanse them from earthly impurities and to return them to their original state.

The embodied or incarnate state is necessary for Logos to first reach human beings. And just like Logos is only an image of the God, the body of Logos - the person called Jesus - is just an image of the Logos, although for the majority of humankind Jesus is the closest they can come to the real Logos. At first, this Jesus was still something distinct from Logos, and like all rational entities, lived in a state of perfection, before arriving to the material world. Yet, unlike other rational entities, Jesus was supposedly in constant connection with Logos. After becoming materialised, Jesus lived a perfect life and suffered for others, thus becoming completely identified with Logos. In fact, when Origen appears to equate Logos with reason in general or with revelation of the God, then this identification of Jesus with Logos becomes a simple statement about Jesus being intimately aware of the God - and in this sense every human being who could share in this awareness is united with the God.

Logos could be called God, because it still was quite close to God. Some people think of forces of nature as gods, which is a step further from the proper use of the word. Still, Origen noted, these worshipers of natural forces can still recognise traces of true divinity in them. For instance, many animals show traces of acting in quite rational manner, although they do not have a reason of their own, because God has made them. It even makes some sense, according to Origen, to worship Sun, Moon and planets, because they are, as many philosophers of the day said, living and rational beings, moving freely through the heavens. Of course, Origen noted, if we asked the planets themselves, they would tell us to worship their creator - they are more perfect than earthly beings, but still far from the God. Indeed, stars had probably also sinned, although not as badly as human beings. In their current state they helped humans by giving them light and warmth.

The final and the most incorrect step away from the truth is to call mere human built images gods, which is complete folly. Indeed, Origen noted, from time to time some maleficent beings occupied such idols, in order to lure humans away from the knowledge of true God. These maleficent beings or demons were, as some Platonists of the time supposed, gaseous entities. They had also fallen from the immaterial or heavenly realm, because of turning away from the God, but their fate was bleaker than that of humans, who in their fleshly state could at least strive for moral perfection, while demons did not have even the will to redemption. Origen suggested that the demons might require incense and sacrificial fumes for their sustenance and that through some unknown natural mechanism they were perhaps linked to names of pagan gods, arriving whenever someone mentioned them. Despite being opponents of the God, Origen supposed demons would still get their chance to perfect themselves.

Analogically with the hierarchy of what to mean by god, Origen offers a similar hierarchy of what one should mean by Logos or reason. We already saw Origen’s notion of people taking embodied Jesus as Logos, although he was only an image of Logos - thus, what Logos was to God, Jesus was to Logos. One step further are proper philosophers, who follow what is commonly called reason, which then should be analogically a creation of Logos, just like forces of nature are creation of the God. Finally, there are people who follow their own fabrication of what reason should be (Origen especially mentions Epicureans), which is then as erroneous form of behaviour as worship of idols.

The route to perfection for human beings lies then, Origen said, in following Logos and through it finding knowledge of God. Against gnostics, Origen noted that there was nothing in the essence of people who followed this route that distinguished them from other human beings. In other words, all human beings could in principle still find perfection, which was then more a matter of choice than birth. Human being had two forces or tendencies drawing them to opposite directions, toward animal life and toward heavenly life, and human being had to make a choice, which path to take. Following Paul, Origen noted that all one needed for salvation was faith in Logos, which would cleanse human being of all imperfection. Even after finding faith one still had to live a decent life, lest one not fall back into a state of sin. This decent life meant going against the way of the world, which often held as profitable what was really something that one should not do.

In comparison to Logos, Origen speaks very little of the role of the so-called Holy Spirit. If the God had power over all existing things and if Logos was meant to speak to all rational beings, Spirit was, according to Origen, supposed to come in contact with people who behaved perfectly in accordance with the guidance of Logos. Spirit thus gave these holy persons, for instance, visions of life in the immaterial realm. In a sense, then, Spirit provided an access to Logos, because it gave people even more perfect wisdom, just like Logos provided an access to the God and so made people even more perfect beings, although being as such had already been granted to them by the God.

In addition to Spirit, a number of lesser entities or angels helped people to find the proper life. Angels, just like demons, Origen supposed, had material, gaseous or starlike bodies. Just like all other things below Logos and spirit, Origen suggested, angels were not without their faults, although they had managed to retain a position higher than humans. Angels and their evil counterparts - the demons - tried to entice humans to follow one of the forces inherent to human personality, angels guiding humans toward perfection and demons toward imperfection.

Origen took it for granted that human beings and indeed all living entities had a power to direct themselves and were not just moved by mere external forces, like mere material, non-living objects. As rational entities humans also have, according to Origen, a power to decide what they would do. Thus, he said, rational entities are accountable for their actions. He was also sure that this capacity for free choice did not contradict God’s power to know all events beforehand - God just has used his pre-knowledge to fashion the events so that free entities will get their just deserts for all their choices. For instance, Origen noted, God knew from the beginning of the world that a certain person would pray for him and organised the events so that this prayer was to be heard. Of course, a precondition for this was that the person in question should pray for the right things, for example, for a salvation from the imperfect, earthly realm or for a help in finding true wisdom.

Somewhat revolutionary in Christian teachers was their willingness to share their teachings with anyone, even if they were not learned or had not lived a perfect life, because, as Origen noted, Logos became flesh for everyone’s sake. Yet, Origen also defended Christianity that it was not meant merely for sinners or weak-minded, but that its teachings should also be heard by wise and virtuous. Indeed, Origen was of the opinion that all believers were not on the same level, but that there were distinctions in their understanding of the truths shared by Logos. Some could only consume easily graspable statements from the Bible, just like some could only eat milk and vegetables. The proper meat or the mysteries hidden behind the allegories were to be revealed only to those with the capacity to handle them. Even these wise people should not brag about their skills of understanding, since in comparison with Logos, Origen noted, all reason was wanting.

Origen even suggested that the truths now shared by Logos were not the most important ones, but only those that were useful for the fallen state of human. Once a human being had completed the proverbial Passover - transition from the earthly state of sin to the perfect state - she was instructed to burn away the means by which she had carried herself over to the other side.

Although the persons in the immaterial or heavenly realm were thus wiser than persons in the material or earthly realm, they still retained the capacity of free choice and might choose to turn away from the God and fall again - this relapse was something that could happen even to angels. This meant, Origen noted, that after this material world had fulfilled its purpose of serving rational entities during their fallen state, another material world might have to be created. Indeed, Origen speculated, a whole series of material worlds might have existed before this one, because God certainly had not been idle before the creation of this world. Origen wasn’t sure whether this cycle of new worlds would continue indefinitely long or whether after uncountable ages a state would be reached, in which all rational entities would follow God’s plan perfectly. Yet, this state of God being found in everything was the ultimate goal of all creation - the end towards which everyone strove.

Back to Plato

It has happened often during the history of philosophy that some philosopher is read from a one-sided or even completely distorted perspective – some feature of his writings is emphasised over others. At some point, then, a supposed return to a more faithful reading follows. Usually this new reading is then distorted in another manner and might even forget features that were taken as central in the first reading.

Something like this happened with the reception of Plato's teachings. Over time, the Platonic academy had developed into a sort of skepticism, which emphasised especially the Socratic of dialogical aspect of Plato's books – different views were weighted and all found wanting. Already during Cicero's time an insistence on a more faithful reading of Plato was apparent – certainly Plato had not thought that knowledge was completely impossible. Problem in this attempt to rejuvenate the Platonism was to decide then what would be a properly Platonic doctrine of philosophy.

One of the people trying to find the essence of Platonism was Plutarch, better known as a biographer of eminent historical persons. Even in his more philosophical works, you can see the historian, who is eager to collect all kinds of sayings and aphorisms, which he will insert to text at appropriate time. Naturally, Plutarch borrows heavily from Plato. One can see influences of Plato even in quite small details, such as Plutarch's opinion that poetry by itself is based on deception and is often detrimental to education.

Yet, Plutarch isn't just a blind follower of Plato, and for instance, does not want to banish poets altogether from a good community. Indeed, Plutarch is willing to use poetry as a means of education, as long as the reader is taught what to accept from poetic works. Thus, although one can find characters in poem expressing all sorts of immoralities, a teacher can point out that these immoralities are clearly condemned by other characters, who express the true opinion of the matter. Then again, Plutarch is highly critical of poems or plays expressing crudities just for the shake of cheap laughter, as he assumes to happen in Aristophanes's comedies. But even worse than such crude poems, in eyes of Plutarch, are supposed histories which are actually just collections of malicious gossips, such as he thinks Herodotus to have written.

In general, Plutarch is interested of matters of education. Indeed, in addition to his take on the usefulness of poetry, Plutarch also gave instructions how one should get most benefits out of a lecture and how one should respect the lecturer. But it is not just to school education that Plutarch's writings are restricted, but he is also interested of educating people to in general live well. Plutarch's general idea of good life was one shared by many ancient philosophers: spending too much time in seeking pleasure makes one sleep badly every night and is bad for health.

Plutarch wanted to especially distance his position from Epicureans. When it came to the method of acquiring knowledge, Epicureans were in Plutarch eyes a bit naive when they insisted that all sensations were true – surely this would lead to contradictions, because things seem different from different distances.

Especially critical Plutarch was of Epicurean notion of good life. Plutarch thought that Epicurean identification of all pleasures as bodily was faulty. For instance, in good parties people received pleasure from conversation, and this pleasure, Plutarch stated, was not bodily, but pertained to soul alone. Indeed, Plutarch insisted, mental pleasures were far more stable than fleeting pleasures of body. Furthermore, Plutarch didn't like the Epicurean idea that good life should be lived unknown. Instead, Plutarch stated, a good person should be happy to inspire others for good life.

Plutarch also criticized Epicurean idea of indifferent divinities and denial of afterlife, both of which were supposed to free humans from unfounded fears. Instead, Plutarch stated, people find hope in the idea of provident and well-meaning gods, and the idea of a total end to life causes nothing but anxiety.

Like many earlier philosophers, Plutarch was intrigued by the behaviour of Spartan people, which downplayed the worth of sensual pleasure in favour of military valour and fortitude. Indeed, Plutarch put on some occasions more value on military efforts than cultural achievements. Thus, he thought that people of Athens were to be more appreciated because of their conquests than their artistic endeavours and he regarded Alexander's conquest of Persia as a great practical application of philosophy, by which the whole Middle-East had been civilized. Then again, Plutarch was also keen to advice how to make anger subside.

Despite his dismissal of pleasure and anger, Plutarch was not ready to speak for a complete Stoic indifference. Plutarch even suggested that Stoics themselves did not really believe in this indifference, because they at some places suggested that things that would be indifferent according to their theories were still to be preferred or avoided. Plutarch even jested about the Stoic advice that a wise person would commit a suicide, if pain would become intolerable – a Stoic sage should be the happiest person alive and still end her life because of such a matter that Stoics considered indifferent.

Plutarch also criticized Stoics, because of their suggestion that a cleft between people living well and people living not well or philosopher and non-philosopher was infinitely wide and that one could only leap from one position to another. Plutarch noted how absurd Stoic idea seemed from the viewpoint of common life, in which we think of goodness and badness of life more as end points in a continuous scale of more or less good or bad life. Thus, he noted that we had various criteria, by which to determine whether a person had progressed in her life skills – for instance, if a person began with a certitude of knowing what is right and true and later on realised how little she actually knew, we could say she had become a better person. Plutarch also jested about the Stoic insistence that a perfectly living person would be the most beautiful sight in the world, but no ordinary person would actually appreciate this beauty and would even consider her to be the most distasteful sight – why would anyone even want to gain such a goal?

While Stoics emphasised a good faculty of choice as the only goal of human life, Plutarch noted that this was only a medium for the true goal. Thus, while Stoics stated that all supposed goals outside the human choice were irrelevant and not to be cared about, like Plato and Aristotle before him, Plutarch sought for a proper medium between indifference and sensuous affects: for instance, although grieving too much for your dead beloveds does no good, a period of mourning is seemly and proper. It is intelligence, which can tell what is proper behaviour in each circumstance and which thus secures human being from chance events. Unlike Stoics, Plutarch suggested that intelligence by itself wasn't responsible for human behaviour, because passions were completely distinct from intelligence and something that intelligence had to train.

Plutarch didn't restrict the class of passions to be trained just to desires for sensual pleasures. He was also quick to condemn such activities as talking too much and being too nosy. In many ways, Plutarch followed Aristotelian idea of virtue as a medium between two vices. Thus, Plutarch was wont to admit that one should not spend too much, but also not to procure too much wealth, or that although one should not be rude to people, one should also not try to serve every whim of other persons, or that even though one was not to praise oneself too much, there still were ways to praise oneself modestly. Then again, Plutarch also admitted that there were things one should refrain from altogether, such as being envy of other people's fortune or taking on debt.

Plutarch gave also more detailed instructions on various aspects of life. Plutarch was even concerned about such quite specific topics as giving advice on what issues to speak about during parties. Thus, he mentions that one could, of course, discuss the formalities of parties – whether some people should have a better seat than others – but also more generally interesting questions, such as whether chicken is in some sense prior to an egg.

Plutarch had also something to say about gender relations. He insisted that men and women should have a common criteria for good life: thus, women can be brave in the same manner as men. Then again, he admitted that males and females might have different natures, which would have an effect on how to apply these criteria. This is well seen when Plutarch advised how married people should live together, as he in a very conventional manner suggested that wife should always follow her husband's will. At times, he even went so far as to insist that wife should be glad if her husband chooses to do things unsuitable for well-mannered women with prostitutes. Then again, he also celebrated marriage as a communion of personalities, which is just strengthened by occasional brief moments of mutual sensual pleasure.

Plutarch also had something to say on how we should act as friends. We should not just flatter people, but to tell them frankly, if they have done badly. Furthermore, we shouldn't try to collect a huge group of friends, since one has only a finite amount of love to give to one's friends. Indeed, Plutarch continues, often enemies are more useful to people than would-be-friends, because they at least reveal our faults more truthfully. Then again, Plutarch was very adamant of the importance of family – even animals show love towards their siblings and offspring, thus, surely should human beings also do that.

Plutarch insisted that a true philosopher shouldn't abstain from dealing with the good life of a community. Indeed, he even encouraged philosophers to educate rulers, if the opportunity arose, since through such means they could benefit a great number of people. In fact, Plutarch thought that anyone with experience on how to live well, such as elder people, should not isolate themselves, but take part in communal decisions. No matter what position one holds in community, however insignificant it may seem, its importance is increased by the worth it brings to the community.

Plutarch wasn't just interested of good life of individuals and states, but he had also a keen interest on the structure of natural world, although he was willing to admit that he could just make reasonable conjectures about such matters. His main point was that the universe was a purposeful construct. For instance, Moon didn't just revolve around Earth by necessity, but its revolution had to satisfy some goal. Perhaps, Plutarch suggested, Moon was a kind of a halfway house between cold and inert Earth and bright and lively heavens, so that souls of human beings could there purify themselves of the last vestiges of earthly life on their journey to completely intellectual life of heavens.

Even more interested Plutarch was of living nature. He was quite convinced that animals were not completely removed from humanity and insisted that they could compete with humans in their various virtues – for instance, some animals could reason as well humans and they were more easily satisfied by natural pleasures. Indeed, Plutarch at time even suggested that eating animals was a cruel habit, especially as no animals devoured humans as often.

Plutarch's most original contribution for philosophy was perhaps his search for wisdom beyond this life and world. Following Plato, he suggested that body was of hindrance to seeing the true reality and that death was therefore nothing to be afraid of, but more like a return to a more divine level. Along with body, Plutarch insisted, all the work dedicated to sustaining the body was ultimately of no importance and it would be far better if a human being could survive without any nourishment. Plutarch ridiculed the idea that eating was of importance, because without the need for food there would be no agriculture and therefore no sacrifices for gods. Plutarch noted that an idea of gods as beings who demanded sacrifices and punished humans for failing to provide them was even worse than atheism – it is better to deny the existence of gods than to call them fickle and cruel.

Even though Plutarch was critical of such traditional ideas of gods, he was quite fascinated of religious practices and myths and often tried to find rational explanations for them. He was not really interested of explaining them as symbols for natural phenomena – for instance, he did not think that the myth of the death of Egyptian god Osiris in the hands of Typhon (Seth) and his eventual rebirth with the help of the goddess Isis would be just a story retelling the cycles of river Nile. Instead, Plutarch saw in this tale hints of metaphysical truths. Typhon was an indication of an idea of a source of imperfection that corrupted the natural world and led to death and dissolution of material things. Then again, nature or Isis could reproduce an image of true eternity or Osiris through its cyclical renewal of everything. Similarly, a letter E inscribed on the temple of Apollo in Delphi was according to him a Greek way of saying ”I am”, which indicates that divinity is a source of all being, just like the more famous ”know thyself” is according to him an advice not to think of oneself as a divinity.

Plutarch also criticized the Stoic notion of divinities, which essentially made lesser gods into mere powerful beings, which could be destroyed as well as any material beings. Even more ridiculous in Plutarch's eyes was the notion that the highest creator God would in no manner be any more blessed and happy than any human being that had just found the perfect mode of life. The highest blasphemy in Plutarch's eyes was the Stoic notion that evil things in the world were created by God and that they were even a necessary part of world condition.

Plutarch used Plato's Timaeus as a foundation of his own cosmogony, although he read the dialogue in a rather creative fashion. According to Plutarch, matter used to be a completely chaotic mess, governed only by a living and self-powered, but also irrational force, which ruled the matter with iron necessity. The divinity ordered the matter into a well-regulated universe and gave the force or soul reason, by which to take care of the world. Still, because the world soul had an irrational beginning, the world still contains some hints of irregularity and evil.

Although Plutarch was convinced that divinity was completely removed from human affairs, he supposed that a hierarchy of other beings bridged the gap between them, and for instance, took care that the wicked would ultimately be punished, if not right away, then in the afterlife. These demigods could also be responsible for divination, Plutarch conjectured. This would also explain, why sources of divination could change according to human needs – demigods would leave places, where people did not live anymore, and they would use more cryptic images in times, when secrecy was of utmost importance.

Then again, human souls might attain a similar status to these supposed demigods, when not tied up to the interests of their bodies. Indeed, the faculty for divination or connection to some divination inducing stuff might well be natural for human beings, but only veiled from us by our body. Socrates was an example of a person whose body did not hinder this divining element, but naturally received messages from a higher dimension, which Plutarch mythologically suggested was somewhere in the upper celestial regions.

We know little about the details of the development of Platonistic currents after Plutarch, but certain common elements seem to have persisted. Apuleius, who even suggested he might be descended of Plutarch, was, like his supposed ancestor, quite interested of mystery religions, such as the worship of Isis, the mother of gods, which in a sense were only avatars of this one central goddess – or God, since speaking of gender is just conventional, when it comes to this prime creator. Just like Plutarch, Apuleius insisted that a turn away from the sensuous world and its pleasures was required in order to reach this ultimate source of everything. Although interested of such mysteries, Apuleius firmly denied that he had any magical powers – he considered himself more of a researcher of the world around him.

A more mundane approach to Plato was apparently favoured by Alcinous, who used Aristotelianism and Stoicism to understand Plato's philosophy. Alcinous presented philosophical contemplation as a step above normal everyday activities: a philosopher can say how humans should live (object if practical philosophy) more reliably than ordinary people, because he knows what there is (object of theoretical philosophy). Yet, like Stoics had already pointed out, before trying to say what there is contemplation should begin by a study of means of contemplation (what was then called logic).

Alcinous gave a Platonic twist to the notion of studying contemplation, when he said that in addition to senses human beings had a capacity to think certain non-sensuous objects, like the Platonic ideas, which appeared to be known by us even before we were born. An important part of human cognition for Alcinous was just this duality of senses and thinking. While senses as such make us acquainted only with individual, unconnected sensations and thinking as such only with immaterial ideas, humans as both thinking and sensing can also combine individual sensations and recognise them as belonging to concrete objects and similarly recognise ideas as embodied in material entities.

The actual methodology Alcinous accepts for his philosophy is essentially Aristotelian logic, with its different parts for strict demonstrations, probable arguments and even a study of deceptive arguments. But Alcinous regards Plato as being already implicitly aware of this methodology, because he used it in his dialogues before Aristotle wrote about it.

Broadly Aristotelian is also the habit of Alcinous to divide theoretical philosophy into mathematics, theology or metaphysics and physics. Like Plato, Alcinous considers mathematics to be of great use, firstly, in practical everyday matters, but also secondly, in leading us to non-sensuous matters dealt in theology. Yet, it is is not the only way, because even by considering what is sensed we can discover something that cannot be sensed. In other words, while sensuous properties are unstable, there must be something, which remains stable throughout these changes – matter. Because this supposed matter should be able to take on any possible sensuous determinations, it itself must be without any sensible characteristics.

Still, matter by itself cannot have taken on different shapes just by itself, but these must have come out of a different source. This is where Platonic ideas come in – ideas work as a scheme by which matter is modeled, Alcinous says. Furthermore, Alcinous notes that this formation must have been instigated by someone – God.

While Apuleius and Alcinous use different routes to find divinity they conceive his relation to the world in similar manner Just like Plutarch, Apuleius and Alcinous saw especially Plato's Timaeus as a serious description of how the world around us had been created. Or actually, they were quick to explain, there was no one moment of creation, but world was in a sense created eternally – world had existed always, but its existence was dependent on the highest god. In a figurative manner we could say, according to Apuleius and Alcinous, that the wholly immaterial divinity had took independently existing shapeless matter and organised it according to ideal principles or forms. Thus, God imposed geometric shapes to the matter and so produced the first elements. From the elements God had shaped various other stuff – stars and planets and earthly bodies – and finally the whole universe. As a ruler of the universe the divinity had appointed a living entity – a world soul – which it had fashioned out of numerical relationships.

This world soul was then the progenitor of all souls in the world. Some of these souls were as immaterial as God itself, such as the gods of Greek mythology. Other souls were embodied or connected with certain physical bodies, which just meant that these bodies thus were alive. Highest of these embodied souls were fiery bodies – these were the stars and planets, which could also be called gods. Apuleisus was especially interested of an even lower rank of aery entities or lower spirits, which acted as mediators between immutable gods and the earthly worlds. Like gods, spirits or daemons were indestructible, but they still weren't as immutable and independent of all other things as gods were.

Some of the aery spirits were connected with bodies fashioned for them by the gods – these were the human souls. Human souls, Apuleius and Alcinous continued, consisted of three parts corresponding to three parts of human bodies – desires residing in stomach and the lower regions of the body, passion or anger residing in the heart and reason residing in the head. Humans shared reason with gods and non-earthly daemons, and thus reason was meant to rule the other two parts of the soul, which would insure the harmony and health of the body also.

Alcinous was especially interested of the Platonic notion that when human reason losed it control over its lower parts, it would become more like an animal and would wonder after death to an animal body. In any case, he was convinced that at least reasoning part of a human would live eternally, although he wasn't so sure about the lower parts.

In a sense, Apuleius and Alcinous regarded Timaeus as the Platonic answer to Hellenistic demand of a theory of universe or physics. Similarly, they wanted to find answers in Plato about ethics, that is, about good life, although often the answers they described as Platonic were actually taken from Aristotle or Stoics. The ultimate good, according to Apuleius and Alcinous, resided in the divinity that had created the world. Even humans could live perfectly only by imitating God and staying in contact with the lower divinities.

Apuleius was somewhat skeptical whether humans ever achieve the goal of imitation of God completely. Indeed, in humans good life, which was naturally a unity, was divided into different facets according to different facets of human soul – wisdom or a good use of reason, courage or wisely controlled use of passion and anger, austerity or a control over desires, and finally justice or a balancing of the three sides of the soul. Alcinous, on the other hand, noted that in a perfect state of human soul these four aspects were essentially a unity – no one could use one's reason perfectly unless one had a perfect command of one's lower faculties, while no one could control one's faculties, unless one could use one's reason perfectly. Still both Apuleius and Alcinous agreed that when we speak of these four aspects of good life in their imperfect, non-unified state, wisdom could be simply learned, but the other aspects require also training of one's lower faculties.

Now, the best thing a person could have, Apuleius said, is the ability to follow these four principles of good life. Only few people could follow these principles perfectly, but then again, only few people lived completely against them, while the majority of human beings lived at least partially good lives – indeed, Apuleius insisted, no one willingly chose a bad life, but this was always a result of ignorance. In comparison, Apuleius continued, other goods are only partially good, that is, good if they are put to good use. Especially pleasure was good only, if it followed a good life, while pleasure following from abuse of the principles was a shameful thing.

Alcinous was more interested of studying affections or irrational processes of human souls, because search for good life required doing something to them. All these affections, Alcinous said, were caused by soul becoming aware of something it considered good or bad – either something that was actually present or something the soul hoped or feared for – or by some mixture of these two basic affections. Alcinous especially instructed people to cultivate natural and necessary affections, which were milder than unnatural affections and thus easier to control by reason.

Friendship and love were topics, which interested both Apuleius and Alcinous. Both philosophers noted that friendship and love come in many levels. Friendship and love were good, if they were guided by principles of good life and showed concern for soul and character of the friend or beloved, whereas friendship and love based on mere seeking of pleasure or self-interest were something fickle and unreliable.

Apuleius and Alcinous also followed Plato's Republic and Laws closely in their description of good and bad communities. In an ideal community, people were governed by wise rulers and defended by brave youngsters. While ideal rulers would need only their own reason for ruling and in a perfect society all things would be common, in practice rulers required laws to guide them and they had to accept private ownership and marriages. If a state lacked wise rulers, the vacuum would be filled, in the best case by soldiers, in a somewhat worse case by rich oligarchs, in an even worse case by democratic assembly, and in the worst case by a single dictator.

Alcinous also considered what distinguished false philosophers like sophists from true philosophers like Plato. While philosophers based their considerations always on the eternal and unchanging source of being, that is, God, sophists took as their foundation things that differed from this source of being and which were thus always in some sense changing and variable. Thus, while a true philosopher would be always unerringly right, a sophist might seemingly change his opinions, as if guided by mere whims.

Reshaping the religion

Until now, almost no mention of religion has been necessary. True, I have described some philosophers as dealing with essentially religious themes, and some religious topics, like the question of divinities, have cropped up regularly. Yet, only now does religion truly start to interact with philosophy. But what then is religion and how did religions and especially religious texts come about?

This will not be a proper historical or anthropological study of actual religious developments, but more like a rough general outline of certain tendencies that may be discerned in the religious life of the environment of Mediterranean. Still, from this general standpoint, we might first note it is a common practice to explain events and happenings through likely scenarios of what might have happened. Some of these scenarios are based on known facts, while others are more speculative, but the common element is that we tell a story of proceedings leading up to the fact to be explained.

Many religious texts abound with such scenarios. ”Why is this mountain called as it is? Because some of our ancestors came to this mountain in certain circumstances, which suggested then this as a proper name for the mountain.” Some of these scenarios were based on more or less reliable historical knowledge, others on mere hearsay and unreliable traditions.

We may note two important types of these scenarios. First type tried to explain certain natural phenomena, such as raining, thundering, blossoming and wilting of flowers etc. - and of course, ultimately, the final existence of the world around us. Second type, on the other hand, tried to make certain habits and customs of a society or culture more comprehensible – why do we act in such and such manner, why do we celebrate certain days of the year etc.?

Almost no human culture has lived in a splendid isolation, thus, it has been quite natural that some of these scenarios or their aspects have traversed from one culture to another. One might have just switched the names of the characters to fit their own store of scenarios. Thus, life stories of certain mythical and even historical persons became confused with all types of stories.

Before these scenarios were put to writing, they were obviously quite modifiable, and one tribe might have quite a bit of variation in their scenarios, when compared to a neighboring tribe. Indeed, when these scenarios were transferred from oral tradition to written form, the writers were forced to make compromises between various relevant versions of these scenarios.

It was also quite common that under new circumstances old scenarios were reinterpreted. If a nation congratulated itself as a chosen nation in its days of glory, a fall of that nation might have required an emendation that the nation was punished because of its bad behaviour. Practices that once were held to be of greatest importance might be ridiculed by later religious innovators as mere superfluity. Layers upon layers of reinterpretation heaped up.

An important element in many of these scenarios was formed by certain human-like personalities with powers beyond human capacities – it makes little difference in this context, whether these personalities were called gods, angels, demons or something else. The main point is that these superhuman persons gave a convenient reason for explaining natural phenomena that were clearly beyond human capacities.

These superhuman persons were not just shaped like any ordinary human being. Because of their power, these persons were often considered regal – kings above kings. And just like with human kings, their whims were something that one ought to obey. Gifts were given to appease divinities or to show gratitude for their grace.

Just like with other scenarios, the scenarios about superhuman persons became layered, when cultures converged and cultural environment changed. When nations with different superhuman persons came in contact, there were different strategies for synthesising the different scenarios. The divinities of other cultures could be incorporated as new gods, unknown before contact, or they could be identified with divinities of one's own culture. In any case, list of superhuman persons would keep on developing.

Unwieldy collections of divinities would require establishing some sort of hierarchy. Different gods and spirits could be taken as having been generated from one another, in a temporal ordering. Then again the gods could also be arranged according to their power and importance in the divine hierarchy and according to their appearance in the supposed history of divinities. In best cases, these two orderings might coincide at least partially and the gods with most power would be earlier in time also – in the most extreme case, the most powerful, highest or even the only god would be the ultimate source of everything else.

In time, the superhuman persons or divinities would be used to back up moral and legal statements. If a person acted in a manner not in line with some moral or legal standards, one could always say that the divinities would punish her: immediately, in the future or even after her death. In this fashion, the divinities would once again play the role of earthly rulers, who had also a duty of upholding the laws of the nation.

The role of superhuman persons as righteous judges in some scenarios and their role as powerful beings with some mischievous whims in other scenarios were in clear contradiction. Sometimes it was easy just to assign these roles to different persons. In a religion like Zoroastrianism, we see two juxtaposed forces, a good creator god battling against a destructive spirit.

In other cases, the assignment could not be done so easily. The Israelite god Yahweh acted sometimes like a dictatorial monarch, condemning all humanity for crimes that appeared to not deserve such a great punishment, yet he was still supposed to be a standard of morality. Gnostic sects did try to use the obvious solution and separate these two roles: Yaldabaoth, insane creator of human world thought himself to be the highest god, although he was only an accidental birth of higher and more benevolent divinities. Yet, the Gnostic rereading of Genesis remained an idea of mere sects, perhaps because the Yahweh scenarios were so deeply entrenched in the Jewish culture.

What is most important from my perspective is what happens when religious scenarios come in contact with philosophical ideas. A case in point is Philo, who read Torah in light of Greek philosophy, especially Platonism and Stoicism. Philo's strategy was to downplay the elements of Torah he finds too marvelous, such as the tales of giants. He even outright denied that e.g. tower of Babel could have been actually built, because the fiery air of the upper regions of the sky would have melted it. Of course, he still accepted things we might find quite fantastic, like the idea of souls as aerial entities descending from the heavens to snatch earthly bodies. Since this was something accepted by many philosophers of the day, Philo did not think it incredible, but quite a scientific story.

Philo also de-emphasised the role of Torah as a historical account, at least in a straightforward sense. Instead, he read Torah allegorically, so that each individual story contained hidden meanings, that could be applied universally to various cases. The basic idea behind this allegorical reading was to make Torah into a philosophically respectable text.

Thus, noting the somewhat confusing fact that Torah has two distinct creation stories, Philo had an explanation ready. God must have first created something akin to Platonic world of ideas, which served as a blueprint for the later, material creation – or actually ”first” refers only to the importance of various parts of creation, since Philo thought that the scenario of creation taking place in six days cannot be a literal truth, because God creates all at once.

This paradigmatic blueprint is a somewhat peculiar feature of Philo's reading. It is not quite clear, if it was meant to refer just to the mind of God or whether it was supposed to be something distinct from the God itself. Still, Philo described it with the Stoic word Logos, and like in Stoicism, it played the role of keeping the material world well-ordered.

Just like Plato had left the creation of earthly things to lower divinities, so did Philo suggest that God used lesser spiritual beings as helpers in the mundane creation. Thus, Philo was able to explain why Torah made God sometimes refer to himself in plural. Furthermore, Philo could then assume the common idea that stars and planets were actually living beings of a higher order than humans.

God created then both an ideal human being, or an ideal of how human should live their lives, and earthly human beings, who in many ways often fell short of this ideal. The scenario of the original sin, Philo read as a universal philosophical account of what led human mind (Adam) astray: it was senses (Eve), which were often beguiled by promises of pleasure (snake).

The true crime of human mind was still not its imperfection, but its arrogant assumption of being in possession of everything in the world (exemplified by Cain), while a better course of life would be to refer all back to God (like Abel did). Even worse than self-centered Cain were ”giants” or earth-bound people, like Epicureans, who followed nothing but their low desires. A counterpart to the giants was Noah, the first inventor of real agriculture, who tilled not only with soil, but with his fellow human beings, cultivating their education. Yet, Noah was just a symbol of a well-acting person, who still lacks the proper perfection of a human being, that is, wisdom.

Story of Abraham then recounts the life of a person learning true wisdom through teaching. Abraham left behind astrological speculations, which originated in Chaldea and which support the notion that world is self-sufficient and uncreated, and moved on to Haran, which symbolises reliance on sense perception that can be used as an evidence for God's existence. His further journies then represent further travails on the road to divine wisdom and his discussions with God show how a good man should let divine truth lead him in all circumstances. When Abraham conceived a child first with Hagar, the servant, and only afterwards with Sarah, Philo understood this to be just a description of the proper order of training – we should first train ourselves with disciplines that serve philosophy and only later with wisdom itself.

While Abraham was the symbolical man who learned wisdom, his son Isaac was supposedly something even higher, a person who is by nature wise. Their difference is symbolised by Abraham receiving a new name after his education, Philo said, while Isaac is always called by the same name. Somewhat less perfect than Abraham was his grandson Jacob or Israel, who was supposed to symbolise a person who learns wisdom – not through theoretical teaching, but through practice. Below all of the three was Joseph, whose knowledge lied in the material affairs of state.

But the highest figure in the eyes of Philo was the supposed writer of Torah, Moses, who was not just the perfect statesman, but also knew the mind of God best of all human beings. Torah was for Philo a book describing rules of conduct. The story of creation in Genesis confirmed the divine origin of these rules and the legendary figures before Moses showed how these rules could be put into practice. The four other books of Torah then stated the rules explicitly, firstly, in summarised form in Decalogue, and secondly, in form of particular laws. These latter laws fell under some general law of Decalogue and often had some symbolical meaning for Philo. For instance, circumcision Philo took to be symbolical expression for cutting away excessive pleasure.

Decalogue and the other laws of Torah thus served for Philo as a general guide of good conduct. The first two commands dealt with person's relation towards God. The created world belies the existence of a creator, and although finite human beings can never hope to completely understand what God is like, they can at least think of his powers, which were for Philo essentially the Platonic ideas giving unity and beauty to the whole material universe. Thus, one should not believe people denying the existence of either God or ideas and one should also not follow anyone who multiplies the number of gods. Furthermore, one should not put any created things, whether sensible or rational, above God, because they are imperfect in comparison.

The three following commands made further demands on a person's behaviour towards God, but on a more symbolical level. Because God is the most constant thing possible, Philo explained, one should avoid swearing to do anything by his name, since such promises must be kept. Since Philo's God had created world that follows certain simple numerical relationships, he also demanded his followers to have celebrations and special occasions according to a strict numeric scheme. Many of these holidays were meant for training our intellect, thus, anyone (even servants) should not need to do any bodily work at those times. Finally, parents were to Philo a symbol of divinity among humans, since they have created life and therefore their children must respect them.

Rest of the commands concerned the behaviour of human beings, when it is not directly involved with God. One should avoid excesses of sensual pleasure, Philo said, and so justified the strict rules governing sexuality in Torah. The only true purpose of sex for Philo was procreation – otherwise sex is merely gratification of one's sensuous desires – and Philo followed this view to its logical conclusion, denying even marriage with a person who is known to be barren.

Although sensuous or material side of a human being was lower for Philo than her intellect, Philo did admit that human body is the highest pinnacle of natural world. Hence, destroying such a body or killing a human being could not be tolerated. Indeed, any attempt to harm a living human being through violence, poison or other means was strictly forbidden.

After quickly condemning thievery and describing correct court proceedings. Philo returned to his pet peeve, the sensuous desire. This time, he was especially interested of the various restrictions on eating. Philo suggested that their purpose was to diminish the pleasure one gets from eating – you shouldn't ear pork, because pork just tastes too good. This was all part of Philo's conviction that material side of our existence is not to be overindulged.

This concluded Philo's attempt to rationalise the laws of Torah. Yet, he also wanted to show that Torah agreed with traditional Greek ideals of living, embodied in Platonic notion of four primary virtues. With some of these virtues Philo had an easy task – he also thought that we should follow wise teachers who know the ways of good living and that we should control our sensuous desires. Justice or the virtue of communal living was embodied especially in the commands of Torah on appointment of the kings and their duties and rights.

Courage was a more difficult thing, because warfare between city states was not so relevant thing anymore in Philo's own lifetime, although he did have the biblical tales of warfare to follow. Thus, it was more boldness at times of peace Philo concentrated on – something Cicero did also. It was especially a certain notion of masculinity Philo was after with his idea of courage – and he was very anxious to point out that Torah forbids men to dress in women's clothing.

Yet, Philo was not quite willing to let the Greek standards of good life to rule over the guidance of Torah. While Plato had thought that respect of divinities was no independent virtue, since divinities really wanted us just to live well, Philo thought that Torah guides us toward respecting God as the most important thing, for instance, through sacrifices. Another important element by which Philo modified Greek and especially Platonic ethics was his suggestion that repentance and humility is something to be respected – if one can admit one's faults, one is at least on a way toward better life.

Furthermore, Philo suggested a quite new way to evaluate worth of person's action, namely, their gentleness in dealing with other living beings. We should treat everyone with respect, even if their condition in life belies of a low social status or even slavery, he said. Indeed, Philo had no respect for supposed nobility by birth, because good persons have had bad children and vice versa. Even animals must be respected and one should not kill or destroy them in an improper fashion.

Philo was then an example of a philosopher trying to rationalise religious texts, but he was definitely not the only one in late antiquity combining philosophy and religion. Indeed, there was one important group of philosophers interested in religions - Platonists - and an important religious group with philosophically inclined thinkers - the Christian Church Fathers.

The proper way of living

Physics that studies things that change in some manner, mathematics that studies invariable properties of these changing things and theology that studies invariable and perfect things are all according to Aristotle meant only to produce knowledge – after I learn how the universe is shaped, I can just enjoy my knowledge. Now, other type of learning changes not just the condition of our knowledge, but also makes us do something. Such practical studies are in Aristotle's opinion lower in status than the former, theoretical studies, because the practical studies are subservient to some external end – you don't study e.g. horseback riding just for the pleasure of study, but for the sake of learning to ride.

Now, all the practical studies form a sort of hierarchy – an art of riding horses might e.g. be subservient to the military science, because horses are ridden because of their usefulness in wars. Clearly, if there is some final end, which is desired for its own sake and towards which all human endeavors strive, there must also be the highest practical field of study, to which all other are subservient. Aristotle suggests that this highest practical study would obviously try to show how people should in general live. Of course, it would not go into details, but it would attempt to discern some general patterns peculiar to a decent living.

What then is the highest type of life for human beings? Aristotle first criticizes some views of contemporary thinkers. Many people would undoubtedly say that human beings life perfectly when they can satisfy all their lusts and desires. Aristotle rejects this possibility lightly: it is fit more for pigs than for human beings. Money is even worse contender for the proper satisfaction of life, because it is required only for the sake of obtaining something else, e.g. a decent living. Honour and reputation fair somewhat better, but these are too reliant on other persons, while a humanly perfect life should be as independent as possible of external influences. Finally, even having capacities is not enough for a fulfilling life – what if one never had to use them?

Another possibility Aristotle considers is the Platonistic idea that there is some perfectly good thing that somehow also makes other things good. Aristotle's dismissal is short. He merely points out that goodness has various meanings, but that such hypothetical source of goodness beyond what we can see and hear has really no relevancy to our life in concrete and diverse surroundings, but that the latter is what we as human beings want to obtain.

Aristotle's own theory starts from the idea that all animal species have some peculiar type of perfection that only they can fulfill. Thus, all plants nourish themselves and most of the animals use senses, and therefore these capacities cannot be the highest state of human being. Then again, the higher, more rational aspect of the human mind should on this account be an essential part of perfect human living. In general this perfection would consist of use and not just enjoyment of various human capacities: true purpose of humans lies in action.

Aristotle also suggests that the life of activity is not just what we should do, but also feels good, that is, if one is a person who lives well – pleasure is something that accompanies activity. True, some pleasures are corruptive, if they go to extremes, but still, pleasure in general wins its opposite or pain. Even bodily pleasures are good, when enjoyed in moderation, and a pleasure of a good life cannot be enjoyed too much. A good person is used to feeling pleasant sensations and emotions only for something perfect – otherwise, she would merely pretend to live a good life. Thus, she will also find her perfect activity a fulfilling and pleasurable experience.

Famous Greek thinkers had suggested that a person's life can never be perfect and a person can never be truly happy before her death – who knows what calamities would befall on a seemingly content person. And even when the person in question has lived her life perfectly her descendants might still do something horrible and stain the name of the family. Aristotle's answer is that a perfect life is almost completely unreliant on such matters of luck, because even in bad situations the person would use what is given to her in the best possible manner. Of course, the more livelihood a person has, the more opportunities for good action she has, but true virtue is shown by how a person uses what he has been given. Furthermore, the woes of the descendants cannot be criterion by which to decide the happiness of one's own life. On the other hand, mere lucky coincidences cannot on the long run serve the needs of a good life.

Activity is then the highest point of human experience. Aristotle continues by discussing various types of such a good life. The nutritive functions of our body are automatic, thus, not under our control and therefore not a concern of the search for highest human good. Then again, the functions peculiar to animals are in our control and are at least potentially in combat with the highest function of human being – reasoning. Thus, a good life consists partly in making one's sensuous impulses obey one's reason. Furthermore, a good use of reasoning forms the other part of good life.

Considering the first element of good life or the subservience of senses to reason, Aristotle notes that it is a matter of habituation to make one's impulses perfectly obey reason. One must e.g. venture into situations requiring courage in order to make oneself more courageous. Then again, merely doing courageous acts does not make one courageous, but one must understand that the action one is doing requires some courage.

In addition, one must voluntarily decide to act in a courageous manner to be truly courageous. That is, firstly, one must not be compelled to do the courageous thing by some external circumstances or by other persons – then again, one might be compelled to do it by one's desires and wants. Secondly, one must understand the nature of the courageous thing one is beginning to do – indeed, if a person regretted what he did after learning the true nature of his actions, he would clearly have acted against her true volition.

In fact, the courageous act must not be just voluntary, but one should have also chosen it. By choice Aristotle does not mean a mere wish that might or might not become real, but an action preceded by a process of deliberation. In such a deliberation person considers things that are under her own power and selects one possible course of action that she will take for a certain purpose. It is such deliberate choices that a person makes that are under moral scrutiny, not the actions that might be forced by external events, such as a threat of death.

Furthermore, one cannot recognize e.g. a courageous or otherwise virtuous person by her state of mind – such a state of mind, like anger or excitement, is itself neutral. On the other hand, a mere capacity for having certain state of mind is also not a good criterion, because such capacities are shared by all human beings. The true criterion is that the states of mind and actions of a person should be based on her stable character – a courageous person is disposed to act in a certain manner.

Just like with the general pattern of good life, we cannot exactly say when a student of virtue has found complete perfection in some area of life nor whether a particular action was completely what was required to do. What one can say, Aristotle continues, is to point out that one can fail in activity either by doing something too much or doing the same thing too few times. Thus, good habits can be seen as a sort of mean between two bad extremes. A person is then to be commended, if it is in her character to choose to do the proper action in a proper time.

Although a student of good life should try too veer away from both ”too much” and ”too little”, often it is natural for human beings to approach one direction. It is such natural aberrations that should especially be avoided, Aristotle says. For instance, it is far more natural to have too little courage than too much courage, thus, one should be more careful about being a coward than about being overly confident.

Aristotelian list of good things to do in bodily matters is clearly based on the standards and values of Greek society. Thus, Aristotle considers that one ought to control one's fear in grave dangers and especially during battle – although it is of course not good to attack enemies without any fear like barbarians. Furthermore, Aristotle commends persons who can control their desire for bodily pleasures like eating, drinking and having sex – still, he also admits that people can and should accept all natural forms of pleasure, because that is part of what being human means.

Courage in battle and resistance of pleasures are virtues of a warrior society, but Aristotle also considers more civilized activities. One should not hold on to every penny, but spend one's money on proper occasions and for noble purposes, although losing all for frivolities is foolish. One should strive for honour, but only by doing honorable things. One should not get angry on small things, but one should still not accept all insults without a say. One should not seek quarrels with other people, but one should still not be afraid of saying the truth, even if it hurts. One should not exaggerate one's merits nor should one understate them. One should know how to laugh and make others laugh, but still avoid cheap laughs. This rather long list of social virtues does not include modesty, because the habit of being ashamed suits only minors, while on Aristotle's opinion adults should have learned to refrain from shameful activities.

The second aspect necessary for good life is the use of one's intellect. The lowest form of this is when a person has the capacity to produce something, such as an artist who can make statues – this is the lowest form, because it requires meddling with things that have a tendency to change in various manners.

The highest form we met in the previous text: it is the Aristotelian wisdom, that is, a combination of an intuitive grasping of general unchanging principles governing everything and of a deductive system based on these principles. It is also, Aristotle says, highest form of good life, which also the Aristotelian divinity enjoys. Contemplation of eternal truths requires very little from a person, and therefore philosophers need not even the company of others when they use their wisdom. In comparison, less eminent virtues require a society in which they could be applied.

Between the capacity of production and wisdom lies the capacity peculiar for practical science, namely, the combination of an intuitive grasp of what is good and proper and of a capacity to apply this grasp in variable circumstances for determining suitable course of action. Aristotle notes that without this practical intelligence one cannot live a truly good life. One might still have an instinctual feeling of proper actions, which would be like a gift from God and thus not a mere coincidental piece of good luck – it is based on the nature and character of the person and not on accidental circumstances. Still, a mere instinct is not enough for life of rational human beings.

By defining what is a good way of life, Aristotle has also determined what sort of life is to be avoided. Now, there are two different manners of straying from the proper happiness of human beings. Firstly, one might be ignorant of true happiness, and for instance, think that excessive life of luxury will make one perfectly happy. Secondly, one might have a correct understanding of good life, but due to violent emotions or other conditions affecting one's mind fail to apply this knowledge – for example, a person addicted to alcohol might be in a state of mind where she can think of nothing else, but the immediate pleasure of drinking, although she would at other times well know the bad effects of over-drinking  Generally, it is especially the pleasures of the body that disturb such a weak character. Still, the weak character at least knows what she should really do and is thus more able to correct her way of life, while a truly bad character cannot even accept that she is doing something detrimental.

Corresponding to the two bad characters, there are two possible manners of living well. Firstly, one may be just so well habituated to the proper way of life that one will not even feel any temptation to go astray. Secondly, one might have all sorts of temptations, but one might still resist them, because one knows that these temptations will be bad – just like a person who desires to eat candies, but refrains from doing it, because it is bad for health.

The bad and the weak person are both governed by natural impulses, which have just become too excessive. Beyond these characters are persons who are governed by impulses for such unnatural actions as cannibalism – such persons cannot really be even condemned, Aristotle says, because they are completely without reason, although their actions are horrifying and inhuman. Aristotle also mentions that there is a corresponding level of goodness, where person's worth exceeds everything that is humanly possible.

Making people live a good life is for Aristotle an essentially social endeavour. Only a minority will follow the proper way of living because of ethical theories, while rest will need some help in breaking out of their bad habits. In large scale, such moral education should be provided by the community, although in practice this task is often left for the parents. Even they should have some knowledge of social relations, although Aristotle despairs of finding proper teachers for this topic: practical politicians have not theoretical capacities for explaining their practices, while sophists who present themselves as teachers of this topic have actually no idea of it.

Social life, on the other hand, is possible only because human beings sometimes want to do good things to one another. Sometimes they just feel sympathy for another person, but at other times they also actively try to improve the other's condition. Indeed, such mutually agreeable social relations Aristotle deems to be an essential part of a good life – others might help you through bad times, and you might gain honour by helping others. Thus, one has to see what things bind humans together in this manner.

One obvious answer is that people often have mutual interests and must thus act like business partners – this happens especially with more mature persons, who think carefully of what is useful to them. Such partnerships based on mutual profit often lead to arguments whether one has gained what one should have – and they very easily break down when their usefulness has ended.

Another reason for partnerships is that the persons involved find their intercourse somehow pleasant – perhaps they like the witty conversation or perhaps they have erotic feelings toward one another. Such partnerships occur most often among young people, who are more easily driven by their feelings. Such partnership or friendship is more lasting than one based on mere mutual profit, but can break down, if the interests and the feelings of the former friends change.

The most perfect form of partnership lies between two persons living a good life. Because they both can recognise how perfect a life the other lives, they must respect and like one another – thus, they will have a desire to interact with one another and to help the other if he happens to be in need. Such a friendship is based on the stable characters of the two persons and last therefore longest, although even they might break, if the moral character of one person should abruptly change for the worse or better. Yet, they are also the rarest sort of partnership, because the multitude of humanity does not understand what it means to live a good life.

The three types of partnerships are all based on the mutual similarity of the persons involved – they have mutual interests, share pleasures or are both good persons. Yet, also persons of unequal status do frequent one another's company. A person may be more useful to another than the other to him, he may give more pleasure to his friend or he may help the other to become a better person. In all such cases the person giving more should get in return more honour from his actions.

On the other hand, affection for oneself could be seen as a sort of limiting case of partnership. Such self-approval comes actually in two forms, Aristotle says. One might approve one's sensuous desires, and such self-approval should be despised. Then again, a person living a good life should surely also like oneself in the perfect sense of the partnership – after all, who would be more closer to one than oneself.

An important element of good social life is that all goods should be distributed according to the merits of the persons – the more a person gives to the community, the more she should also get from community. Here one could get more than one deserves and thus have an unfair advantage, or one could get less than one deserves and suffer injustice. The mean state is then where a person gets her just desserts. Just person is then one aiming always for that mean state.

The just distribution of goods is based on the worth of the persons involved, but justice in another sense is not related to this personal worth. That is, sometimes a person has in full awareness or accidentally got something that belongs to another person or in other way hurt that other person – for instance, she might have robbed and beaten someone. It is then a task of some mediator or judge to mitigate the wrong experienced by the other – and the judge should make her decision based on the act and not the character of the persons involved. A just judge is then one that can give correctly balanced retributions.

Both forms of justice presuppose some standard by which the goods and the bads can be measured. In general, we must be able to say e.g. how much one shoe is in comparison with one horse. Thus, societies have found it convenient to assign some items a task of serving as a measure of exchange – shoe pays for 5 coins, horse pays for 50 coins, thus, you could get a horse with ten shoes. It is then at least somewhat conventional what is just and what is not – in some cultures horses might be valued less and a just price of them would be less. Still, Aristotle thinks that there are some inherently just or unjust actions, although he does not clearly explain what they would be.

Furthermore, justice in general requires that the persons involved should be free of one another, Aristotle continues. Thus, if a person is property of another, the owner cannot fault the owned. Still, one can speak analogically also of just conduct towards slaves, children and wives, although it is not justice in the proper sense.

Justice occurs also only between two persons, although Plato had figuratively spoken of a balance between various characteristics of mind as justice. Aristotle's point is that justice/injustice requires at least two persons, one of whom tries to correct some harms she has suffered. If the two persons would actually be one and the same person, some of the gains of the person would actually be also her losses. This is actually an instance of a wider area of expertise: immoral actions cannot happen towards oneself. A suicide appears to be a counter example, but actually one must note that in suicide it is the community that has something to say about the death itself.

A special field of interpersonal relations is the household, which mostly consists of partnerships between unequals. The economy of Greek city states was based on slavery, and Aristotle was thus bound to accept that people had slaves, who had to obey their masters in all things. He justified the keeping of slaves by suggesting that some persons are naturally meant to be ruled, because they lack the proper resources of managing themselves and their own affairs. Natural masters, on the other hand, have a knack for seeing where the work of the slaves could be used best. Not surprisingly, Aristotle felt that non-Greeks on the whole had a more slavish nature than Greeks. Aristotle also admitted that often persons who had a natural right to be free were in fact enslaved – this happened especially in war, where all defeated were enslaved, although they would have the constitution of a ruler.

Just like masters were supposedly fit to rule natural slaves, Aristotle thought that adults have an essentially higher status than their children. Children have an untrained and raw constitution and therefore adults have the duty to raise them to be independent adults. Aristotle thought also that husband is naturally a better and more able person than his wife, from whom the husband should distinguish himself through his natural superiority. The closest to a true friendship of equals comes the relation of two brothers – and even here one brother is older and thus more respected.

Maintaining a household is not restricted to just governing the interpersonal relations in it, but one must also care for the material needs of the household by acquiring sufficient goods. Aristotle felt that the most natural way to acquire useful goods was to procure them with one's own efforts, e.g. through agriculture. If all needs could not be satisfied by oneself, one could also trade one's own products with those of others. These forms of acquiring goodness have natural limits determined by human needs, but there are also unnatural forms, whereby one e.g. uses money to gain more money – for instance, by giving loans with a interest. As the quest for more money can never be fulfilled, Aristotle commends ignoring it.

The existence of many different interpersonal relations causes the potential problem of preference: which relations should matter most when one cannot fully serve all of them, e.g. when the needs of one friend go against the needs of another? Aristotle notes that no hard and fast rules could be given for all cases, although some relations are more important than others, for instances, close relatives are usually to be respected more than other people.

The final step in the attachment of persons to one another is the creation of a community of several persons, where such a community could feel a similar concord as two friends or relatives. Aristotle felt that the drive towards forming communities is inherent in human nature. As community then is a natural whole, it will be in a sense more important than the individuals forming it – community is the end of the individuals and not the other way around. Even so, in a common type of community a completely perfect life cannot be lived, Aristotle continues: usually people have to take turns when to rule and when to be ruled in a community, while a perfect life would consist only of ruling.

An important question Aristotle considers is whom should we consider as members of any community. He rejected the idea that a community would consist of all people living in a certain area – then even slaves and foreign visitors should be considered part of the community. Indeed, a community is not just a collection of people, but a common undertaking of people for a good and noble life.

A true criterion of citizenship, according to Aristotle, is that a member or citizen of the community should take some part in the official proceedings of the community – thus, even children fail to be true citizens, before they grow up. A peculiar consequence of Aristotle's definition is that a community is automatically changed whenever the power relations between people change – still, Aristotle notes, the new community might have a duty to take care of some of the old community's debts.

Aristotle thought that a community should be large enough to be independent of other communities, but small enough to be governed in a reasonable manner. It should be close to sea to facilitate trade, although care should be taken that the foreigners wouldn't bring with them any bad influences. Climatewise Greece is an ideal place for communities, because it is warm enough to make intellectual life possible, but not so warm as to encourage luxurious life.

Now, the management of the community could be managed in several manners. A question of the best possible constitution for a community was a topic much discussed at the time, and Aristotle had lot to say on the various suggestions. Many people thought that e.g. the constitution of Sparta was the most optimal in existence. Aristotle did admit that there is much to commend in the Spartan manner of living, but still saw too many failings to be perfectly happy with it. The main problem was that Spartans had shaped their community for the sake of warfare, but had then ignored the actual management of the community's day-to-day affairs. The result was that the community didn't spare efforts for making its soldiers brave and skilled in martial arts, but did not take care that its rulers wouldn't take personal advantage of the spoils of war.

Plato's theorizing of an ideal community Aristotle found even more unsatisfactory. A particular piece of criticism concerned Plato's suggestion that the rulers of an ideal community should form a one big family, in which all wives and children would be shared. Aristotle notes that a community should not form as close a unity as a family – then it would not be a community, but a family. Furthermore, he was also convinced that Plato's scheme would not really make the bonds of the rulers as close as the bonds of family members – if affection was to be shared in a big group, it would be bound to be diluted, Aristotle thought.

Aristotle was thus not satisfied with mere theoretical categorizing of possible types of community, but he made careful research on what forms of government the different Greek cities had and how they had developed over time. Only on the basis of these investigations did he then construct a schematic classification of all possible governments.

Besides describing different communities, Aristotle also tried to discover how these communities collapsed and were replaced by other types and how such a collapse might be prevented. Plato had also theorised about the collapse of societies, but Aristotle felt Plato's ideas were lacking: Plato saw only a one line of progression from a constitution to another, while Aristotle admitted that there were several possible ways a community could change. Moreover, he was certain that communities sometimes changed only partially and might even keep the type of constitution, if the change in question was minor.

The primary principle Aristotle followed is that there is not a single recipe that all communities should follow, but that there are many possible options of governing a community: although one type of community would be best, it might not work for all communities. For instance, a rule of the best and the brightest can be justified by professionals knowing things better than laymen, but then again power of common people can also be justified by the argument that many eyes see things better than just one or few eyes. Furthermore, a rigid law is usually more stable than reliance on an unpredictable individual – still, if a person of a remarkable mental stature surpassing all laws were found, we would have to either banish him or relinquish all laws and make him the rightful king.

Thus, according to Aristotle's classification, the community could have a single leader caring for the well-being of his subjects – such a community would resemble the rule of a father towards his children. The paradigmatic case of such a monarchical community is a perfect absolute ruler knowing best what is good for everyone – an ideal community under an ideal governor with full authority. Still, there are monarchies, where the role of the king is more restricted and regulated through laws. In some cases king is just a fancy name for a master of ceremonies.

The main lack in the kingly rule is that it is too much based on the goodness of the ruler. If the ruler was somehow corrupted or if his follower had not the same qualities, the state of the community would quickly deteriorate  Aristotle therefore suggested that the rule of the king should be divided among many officials.

A single individual might err from a correct path, but several individuals could then correct the mistakes of one. Thus, one possibility for managing the community is that the governing should be left to a number of able men. These rulers would have a nature superior to their subjects, just like husbands are, according to Aristotle, wiser than their wives. If these able men were just like the divine ruler in the absolute monarchy, we would have another variation of the ideal community. Because of their worth, the rulers should be free of menial work. The number of the rulers would be kept limited through abortions and slaying of handicapped babies – a brutal practice common in Greek societies.

An important aspect of an ideal community was to be an education of future rulers – a task so important that it shouldn't be left to private citizens. The aim of the education shouldn't be warfare, but peaceful community life. Thus, the rulers should not just be trained in sports, but also in music – not so much to play, but to listen music. The education should begin by training the body and only then personality. In personality we should first educate the habits of the future rulers, and last the most important aspect of human life or intellect. After education is over, the citizens would at first spend a couple of years serving in military. In full maturity, they would become governors, and in old age, they would tend of religious cults.

In a somewhat less ideal type of constitution, the governors would be elected among the most able men of the rich and the noble. All constitutions based on a minority rule face the same problem – the group of truly able people is usually smaller than the group of people thinking they are able, which might thus lead to factions and civil disorder.

The final possibility is a constitution in which all citizens are at least in some measure able to control their lives – such a community would resemble the relation of brothers to one another. A majority of a community cannot be ideal rulers, hence, this sort of community could not be ideal. Still, it could be best that is possible in all circumstances and for all types of people. In this realistic option, no unfair advantage should be given either to the poor or to the rich. The poor would be encouraged to take part in politics by donating them money when they took part in public meetings, while the rich would be discouraged to shy away from politics by appointing fines if they avoided public meetings. Furthermore, Aristotle thinks that a strong middle class would be an essential element in keeping such a constitution in order – the middle class would have no desire to give too much power to either the poor or the rich. The problem is, of course, to guarantee that the balancing act works and doesn't tip to either extreme.

Indeed, these relatively good forms of government could also turn into caricatyric types, where the rulers would care only for themselves and not others. The search of a just share of votes might be replaced by the masses wanting to search gain for themselves. The poorer the masses are, the more extreme such a government would be. In milder forms of mass government, there are still laws that are followed, but in more extreme forms the whims of the rabble and demagogues exciting it rule everything. Such a rule of the rabble might quite easily descend into a complete tyranny, if the people gave their power to a single ruler. Instead, one should try to have more upper class people involved in the government, so that the rich would not be afraid that the poor will use the state to take away their money. Indeed, a good democracy should make all citizens more wealthy, so that no discontent factions would arise.

Then again, the aristocratic constitution based on the goodness of the governors could be changed into a community ruled by most powerful and wealthy – in a household such an event might occur, if e.g. a wife would be allowed to govern her man because of the money she owns. In some cases the upper classes might allow a movement upwards in the society, if the person involved would acquire the necessary financial means. In the worst case, one group of wealthy people would take complete control of the community and prevent anyone else having anything to do with government. The wealthy people might then turn into factions fighting one another. Then again, the rich might aggravate the poor to revolt their rule. If the rich wanted to make their rule stable, they should let even the less rich have some means of taking part in government. Furthermore, the governors should use their wealth to make the community as a whole a better place to live.

Finally, a king might become a tyrant, who rules everyone like master commands his slaves. Even such a tyrannical rule might be tempered by customs and laws, but in the most extreme case, one man would govern anything according to his own wishes and desires. Tyrannical communities are the least stable of governments – its weak points include the possibility of another person grapping hold of the tyrant's position and the possibility of the poor leading a revolution. The tyrant might improve his chances by using literally tyrannical methods and e.g confiscating the property of suspicious individuals. Another possibility would be to make tyranny into a more king-like constitution by showing good example to all citizens.