Harmony of trinity, harmony of church

One of the questions haunting Church Fathers after the Nicene council was the problem of trinity: how can the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit be just one God with the same substance and always acting in unison, although Bible speaks of them as three distinct entities that seem to do quite different things and even interact with one another? No wonder then Augustine also felt the need to study this problem. He is eager to underline first that all the three are on an equal level, so that e.g. the Bible can say that by knowing Son or Word one would also know the Father or the source of the Word. Then again, Augustine admits, the Bible can speak about the Word in the human form as on a lower level, because the human shell is lower than the divinity of the Word, being something that can be sensuously perceived, unlike divinity.

From the standpoint of the equality of the persons of trinity, it becomes problematic what does it mean when Word or Spirit are sent by the Father. Augustine suggests that this phrase simply means giving these individual persons a physical manifestation, in the first case, in the form of Jesus, and in the second case, in the form of e.g. the dove landing on Jesus during his baptism. Augustine also thinks it likely that in all the cases where God is said to have appeared in some form to prophets of the Old Testament, for instance, as a burning bush shown to Moses or as the three men visiting Abraham, what has appeared was the whole trinity with all the three persons. He underlines that such physical manifestations of God or of any of the individual persons of trinity have never revealed their true nature, which is something that cannot be sensed, but only grasped by thought.

Augustine notes that in all earnestness God could be said to manifest physically in every event of the material world, since even the regular course of nature is ordained by God’s will. It is just that miraculous events are so out of the ordinary that they strike us more forcefully as having been instigated by divinity. Even in these cases, Augustine thinks, what occurs is probably not completely removed from the regular course of nature, but God most likely e.g. takes advantage of existing potentialities within material objects and merely accelerates some processes that would have otherwise required more time to develop. Augustine suggests that especially in the miracles of the Old Testament God appointed the task of performing them to angelic beings who had the knowhow and the means to activate these hidden potentialities.

The special case of Word being sent by the Father, Augustine explains, refers to the important event of Word combining itself with a human soul and body, in order to unite through this link the whole of humanity with divinity. Through the death of the body – in other words, through the willing separation of Word from the body of Jesus – Word cancelled the spiritual death of humans – the separation of humanity from divinity, which had led them to fear bodily death, which means just separation of human soul from the body. Augustine emphasises that the Word is sent by the Father – and later Spirit is sent from the Father by the Word – because Word has been in some sense derived or emanated from Father as the source of the other persons of divinity, yet, even as emanations the Word and the Spirit are of equal worth and power with the Father and all three persons act concurrently in each of their actions.

The three entities – Father, Word or Son and Spirit – should share the same essence or substance. This implies, Augustine says, that they all – the trinity – are what is existent in the most proper sense of the word. In other words, he explains, they cannot change or lose any characteristics: everything in them is substantial, not accidental. In this the trinity differs from everything else that does change and lose characteristics, like a human being who loses their hair or has it turn white, when they become old. This does not mean, Augustine adds at once, that everything that can be said of the three entities of the trinity must be substantial, because we can also discuss their relations, which are not characteristics in the same sense as e.g. whiteness is the accidental characteristic of hair. This is true, he notes, of the relations between the persons of the trinity: for instance, Father is somehow the source of the Word, which is thus to be called Son in relation to Father, but neither of these statements says anything about the essence of either Father or Word and thus does not essentially distinguish them. Augustine notes that the same is true of negations of relations: Father has no source, but this tells us nothing about the essence of the Father.

Augustine makes it clear that once we are not speaking of the relations within the three entities or persons of trinity, we must think of the trinity as forming a single substance, so that e.g. the whole trinity governs the world as a unity. Then again, if we speak of the relations between the three persons, we can distinguish them. This is true even of the third person, Spirit. Augustine suggests that Spirit refers to the community of the Father as the source and the Word as proceeding from that source and is something that the two persons can share as a gift with other beings, in order to take them into the presence of the whole trinity. This does not mean, he explains, that there must always be some creatures, to which Spirit is shared, but only that Spirit is something which creatures could always have communion with, if they just existed and had prepared themselves for this communion. In general, Augustine adds, whenever we are speaking of relations of creatures to trinity, these relations are changeable, but do not imply any change in the trinity, but only in creatures: for instance, when God or the trinity is said to become like a father to good people, this means just that these people have managed to become so attuned to the divine that they can feel the presence of the trinity.

For Augustine, Word is like a projection from the ungenerated source, so that the Word can be described as an image of Father. Yet, he at once adds, this projection does not happen in time, so that Word exists as timelessly as its source, and furthermore, Word is a perfect image in the sense that it has the exact same essence as the source, both being equally perfect in their powers and characteristics. Similarly Spirit as the community or love between the source and its projection is equally eternal and equally powerful and perfect. Thus, Augustine concludes, there is no difference of rank between the different persons of the trinity. Because of this complete similarity and the complete perfection of each of the persons, he adds, the trinity as a whole is also not higher in rank than the individual persons. Instead, the trinity is not at all like a collection of three bodies, but forms a unity tighter even than the human soul, which despite its unity still has distinct and separable capacities.

Augustine notes that any words trying to explain the structure of the trinity will ultimately fail. What we can say, he thinks, is that the ungenerated source, its projection and their communion of love are all in a sense more unified than anything created and still somehow separate and countable as three. Yet, when we try to find words to describe what in them is one and what is three, we cannot. Augustine notes that the Greek say that there is one essence (ousia) in trinity, but three substances (hypostasis), but that in Latin essence and substance mean ultimately the same. He adds that the word person has therefore been introduced, but that is as inadequate as any other words, since we might as well say that the trinity is one person.

Augustine emphasises that the divine trinity is completely different from any other entity: while the three persons of the trinity are of equal rank, all other entities of some kind – say, three rocks – come in a hierarchy. This is an indication, he thinks, that the trinity is the greatest and therefore the worthiest object of adoration that everyone should love. The problem is, Augustine notes, that the trinity is so unlike anything we experience that we seem to have no idea what it is that we should love: it is not like when we hear of a city that we have never visited but that we can imagine by others telling us of its properties, or when we understand an apostle being a virtuous person, because we know what virtue is like. The solution that he provides is the biblical phrase that God is love: when we properly love our fellow human beings, we also love the divine love itself that combines us with other humans. Furthermore, Augustine explains, this love is like the divine trinity in that it involves the one who loves, the one who is loved and the community of love combining the two.

Augustine notes that this trinity involved in love seems to reduce to duality, if the one loving is the same person as one loved, say, when a human mind loves itself, since there are now only two things combined, namely, the mind and its love of itself. Yet, he adds at once, it still involves a sort of trinity, since the mind must also know itself, before it can love itself, and this self-knowledge of mind is different from mind itself and its self-love, yet, they are also intricately connected, and if perfect, of equal stature. The self-knowledge in particular – or indeed, any knowledge, Augustine says – is like a word in our minds that we can project from ourselves through speaking, although even then it remains also in our mind. Furthermore, he adds, proper knowledge of something is always connected with love, which means not just appreciating this something for its own sake, but for the sake of its Creator. This is in a sense true even of bad things, like injustice, Augustine thinks, although then we do not love the injustice itself, but the knowledge we have of it. This love, he emphasises, is not a projection like knowledge that we speak in words, but in a sense pre-exists the knowledge in a sort of desire to know something, proceeding directly into existence from our mind.

Augustine observes a curious feature in the idea of desiring to know something: surely we must already know at least partially what we want to know more of. Thus, he concludes, the mind must already be aware of itself in some manner, in order to be able to desire knowing itself. The mind just has a tendency to confuse itself with the images of material objects and therefore it might identify itself with e.g. the brain. Yet, Augustine insists, the mind cannot be material, since it is not spatially extended. Hence, in order to truly know itself, he suggests, the mind must ignore all material images and notice that even while doubting everything else, it still can remember and be sure about its own existence. Augustine takes this memory of oneself as the third element in addition to knowledge of oneself and love of oneself as completing the analogy with the divine trinity in the human mind.

Having found an analogy of the divine trinity in the human mind turned toward itself, Augustine wonders whether something analogical could be found even in the human turned outside itself. He suggests that there is such a trinity in visual sensation, since the visible nature of the object imprints a sensory image due to a volitional act of attending to the object. Here the visible nature is a physical thing, sensory image a bodily thing and the volition a mental thing, and still all three are so intrinsically connected into a unity that during the sensation we do not even distinguish between the visible nature and the sensory image, although it can become apparent, when we close our eyes and still see a faint image.

The trinity of sensation has a tendency to lead us astray from ourselves, even when we are not actually sensing the object in question, Augustine thinks. This means, he explains, that an idea of the object is left in our memory, and our will to remember the object in question combines this memory to an internal vision or recollection of this memory, producing yet another trinity. In this trinity, all the three components are mental, Augustine notes, and still it can produce as vivid an experience as sensation of an external object, as evidenced by our dreams.

Both the sensation of a present object and the recollection of an absent object can be either good or bad things, depending on the nature of volition combining them, Augustine notes. Thus, if we look or think about these objects only for their own sake, this means a perversion of our will, but if we are interested in them because of their connection to God, the sensation or the recollection is beneficial. Indeed, Augustine adds, both sensation and recollection resemble the divine trinity, since in both the first element (the visible nature or the image stored in our memory) generate sthe second element (the sensory image or the recollection), while the third element (will to sense or recollect an object) is neither generative (requiring the original object or memory) nor generated (pre-existing the sensation or recollection), but merely combines the two other elements.

Augustine also points out that the sensation is more essential than recollection, because we could not recollect something we had never sensed. In fact, he insists, sensation of an object and memory of an object form in a sense yet another trinity, where our will to put something in our memory connects the original sensation to a mental representation stored in our memory. Yet, Augustine adds, we still can remember – or imagine, it might be better to say – something we have never sensed, say, a black swan, just assuming that the components of this novel mental image are something we have sensed.

Sensation and recollection of temporary, material objects, Augustine considers, belongs to the external side of human being, which can have the form of trinity, but still is more animal than divine in us. Even so, he adds, our intellect has the potential of turning away from these considerations of temporal things toward eternal truths, such as those found in geometry, and while thoughts of temporal things divide human beings, thoughts of eternal things unite them, so that everyone could in principle be reminded of these very same truths. Augustine considers the Platonic explanation that this possibility of awakening knowledge of eternal truths is based on humans learning them in a former life, but finds it lacking: if Plato’s theory were true, we would as well know temporal matters from our former life, and besides, we cannot assume all of us had been mathematicians.

Despite the difference between the external and the internal side of a human being, what the external side perceives might act as a sign for something in the internal side, Augustine states. Thus, he explains, through hearing a text to be read concerning some persons, we can not just receive a picture of what these persons look like, but also an idea that these persons have a certain internal state, because we ourselves are familiar with the same internal state. This means, Augustine thinks, that the internal sides of every human being are somehow connected, so that we can say, for instance, that all human beings desire happiness, even if they do not always have a proper idea of what would make them happy. Furthermore, he adds, we know that everyone wants to continue existing indefinitely in such a state of happiness or bliss. Augustine suggests that due to the testimony of the Bible and the Church, the Christians have faith that this goal of eternal happiness can be achieved through divine salvation. The memory of this doctrine, the active thinking of it and the will to believe it form then another image of trinity, and this time such that is closer to the internal side of human beings.

Faith is already a high form of trinity, Augustine says, yet, it is still something temporary, since in the future life we should not need it anymore, leaving behind a different trinity of a memory of faith, an active recollection of faith and a loving desire to remember faith. More perfect, he thinks, is the aforementioned trinity of remembering, understanding and loving oneself, since it is always at least implicitly present to the human mind, with the possible exception of very early childhood. Yet, Augustine contends, we can reach an even higher form of trinity, when we literally become an image of the divine trinity and remember, think and love it.

Even this image, Augustine states, falls far behind the divine trinity. Although we could say that the divine source is like latent knowledge of memory, Word like the expression of this knowledge in the language of thinking and Spirit like the love of and desire for this knowledge, the persons of trinity are still full entities in the sense that e.g. Father and Word also love, each person thus sharing the characteristics of others.

One might object to all these musings about the divine trinity that we cannot really perceive such a thing at all, but must ultimately just believe in it. Augustine has an answer ready. Belief or faith, he says, is something we have to use every day, say, when we believe that our friends have good intentions, since intentions are something we cannot literally see. Augustine is also ready for the rejoinder that we do see the effects of other people’s intentions in their actions. He thinks that the success of Christianity against traditional polytheism is a similar sign of its truth, since this success is something that has been foretold in the holy scriptures.

Understandably Augustine is keen to argue for the reliability of these scriptures and especially such a central part of it as the Gospels. He has to defend the objection that none of these books was written by Jesus with the argument that such famous Greek philosophers as Pythagoras and Socrates did also write nothing for themselves. Furthermore, he goes painstakingly through all the Gospels and tries to show that the different accounts of the four books can be fitted together without any contradictions: for instance, if one Gospel seems to suggest that events happened in an order different from another Gospel, the author of one might just have recollected the events in a different order.

Similarly Augustine wants to show that seemingly contrary sayings attributed to Jesus can be reconciled. For example, when Jesus in one Gospel says that those who act not against him are on the same side, but in another that those who do not act with the Christian community are against it, Augustine suggests that the former saying refers to working for the benefit of the church, even without officially belonging to it, while the latter refers to schismatics, who nominally do belong to the church, but weaken its unity.

Augustine's reading belies his attitude toward schismas like the Donatism. He accuses its followers of regarding themselves as holier than the rest of the Church, although the divine scripture had warned against breaking up its unity. Augustine also discredits their insistence on being martyrs, since that title should not be awarded to everyone being punished by the authorities, especially as the punishments in question were mild and more tried to convince Donatists of their errors. Augustine notes that if Donatists were as good as they claim to be, they would tolerate the presence of the less holy in order to retain the peace within the Church. Then again, he adds, they cannot be completely good, since no human being is capable of such perfection. Thus, Augustine concludes, when Donatists insist that priests should be perfect, they ask impossible things. Furthermore, he adds, their insistence is unnecessary, because it is the Christ that does the sacraments like baptism through priests – or even through a regular person. It is not even a tremendous error, if a bad person is baptised, Augustine says, because in the end, God will separate the good from the bad. Thus, he concludes, the Church should not ostracise any of its members from its midst due to their supposed sins, but they should be gently reprimanded and tolerated within the community.

Augustine’s desire to uphold the Christian community goes so far as to reprimand persons who refrain from any physical work for the community on the pretext of their communion with the divine – one can pray even while one is working, he says. The only excuses he allows for not engaging in physical work are bodily infirmities and duties involving governance of communities.

Considering Augustine’s interest in preserving the harmonious unity of the Christian community, it is no wonder that he made careful considerations also of the manner in which new members should be introduced in it. The intricacy of the details and the style of the introduction should be adjusted according to the person, he explains, because an educated person comes with a completely different pre-understanding than someone with no education.

The crowning moment of the introduction to the Christian community is for Augustine the baptism. Now, the existence of schismatic sects like Donatists raises the question whether baptism should be received only from the priests of the mainline church – a problematic question, because Donatists thought that the proper baptism was to be found only in their midst. Augustine’s solution is again to speak for the unity: while he is against the Donatist stance, he is willing to accept baptism given by their sect as acceptable also in his own church, as long as the person receiving them will eventually join the unity of the mainline church. He compares Donatists with Cyprian, an early bishop of Carthage, who, like Donatists, had entertained views on baptism, not in line with what would become the norm in Catholic church, but who also, unlike them, was willing to concede with the judgement of the whole church in this matter.

Usually, Augustine states, salvation requires baptism – no matter what sect has given it – and a willingness to live in accordance with the rules of the church. If one of the conditions is missing, the person in question will be damned, although Augustine does surmise that the punishment waiting for them will be proportional to the faults of their character. Yet, he notes that a person lacking the baptism, not due to their own fault, but due to the circumstances, and willing to be saved, will be saved, like the robber crucified beside Jesus. Similarly, Augustine suggests, a baptised child will be saved, although they cannot as yet have any conscious intention of living in accordance with the church rules. Augustine also raises the question whether the ritual of baptism will have any effect, if it is done in a comedic manner, with neither the baptiser nor the baptised taking anything seriously. He avoids taking any stance on the issue, leaving the problem to be decided by later councils.

The harmonious unity of the church is reflected on the level of individual families where, according to Augustine, marriage between a man and a woman is not just a convenient arrangement for propagation of species, but a spiritual companionship that lasts even if the need to bear children has dissipated. He does admit that marriage usually also has a fleshly component, due to human weakness for sexual intercourse, even without the desire for offspring, but following Paul, he suggests that the marriage at least partially redeems this otherwise indecent behaviour. But what makes a union of a man and a woman into marriage? Augustine suggests that all it takes is one act of sexual intercourse, even if not performed for the sake of procreation. Indeed, he insists, if one then chooses a completely different person for one’s official spouse, this constitutes adultery. Similarly, Augustine continues, the lack of offspring is no reason for dissolving marriage. The only thing that can then break the link of marriage is the death of one of the married persons.

It was customary in the early church to place virginity on a higher rank than married life: while marriage was no sin, virginity was more commendable. Yet, Augustine insists, although true in abstract, it may well be that a virgin lives otherwise in a more reprehensible manner than a married person. He is especially keen to warn virgins that they should not become prideful due to their supposed holier status.

Augustine’s refusal to put virgins on a pedestal reflects his insistence to not demand perfection from priests handing out sacraments, like Donatists did. Just like we cannot know whether a virgin is otherwise a sinful person, we cannot ever know the mind of a priest, which could be filled with impure thoughts. Thus, if the force of baptism was dependent on the morality of the baptiser, it might never be valid. The Donatists try to answer that the person to be baptised should test the character of their baptiser, but, Augustine points out, we can never be completely sure that such a test would work. Indeed, Augustine argues, it is the Donatists who sin in trying to divide the singular baptism of Christian church into two kinds, accepting only baptisms of their own sect. He himself advises to always adhere to the unity of the church, even if it is far from perfection and full of people who sin – in the end, God will separate the tares and the chaff from the wheat of the congregation, but until then all should be let to grow within the one community of the Christians.