The Stoic Attitude

Although we've seen philosophic schools like Epicureans and Academics find followers in Rome, by the time of Imperial Rome it was definitely the Stoic school that had the most prominent and influential members – take for instance, Seneca, famous as a minister for the emperor Nero.

It was a clear need for education that drew Seneca to philosophy. He admits that learning anything for the sake of profit is not worth the time of a gentleman – a common attitude among ancient philosophers. But not even the usual studies of nobility of his time satisfied Seneca. Grammar and poetry are of no consequence in matters of life, and neither is music. Mathematics can be useful in ascertaining the lay of my lands, but this does not still tell me whether I should own land at all. And even if astrological predictions are true, it is of no use to know my future, if I cannot avoid it.

Even all areas of philosophy were not so important in Seneca's eyes. Logic he especially regarded as often concerning itself with mere trivialities. What does it help to know in how many ways word “friend” is used, if it does not tell us what to do to a friend? Seneca ridicules even the seemingly clever syllogisms of Zeno and other Stoics, who try to prove great ethical truths with simple logical tricks. Even worse is to spend time thinking about fallacies like Liar's paradox – learning about such mistakes in reasoning does not advance us at all in what is truly important in our life.

Yet, abstract reasoning about genera and meaning of being might have a place in life, Seneca admits, for if one is to be entertained, one might even at least train one's mind with one's entertainment. And at least Platonic idea of true being residing in something covered by reasoning shows us not to hold things of sense world in great value.

Questions about nature Seneca found somewhat more interesting, and he even compiled a treatise of curiosities of natural phenomena. Although interesting in themselves, these phenomena also point to some builder behind all these wonders, who shares a similar relation to world than soul to its body. The existence of such a creative intelligence suggests to Seneca that life of a person continues, even when separated from its dying body.

But it was especially the question of how to live that interested Seneca and one that he thought philosophy was especially fit to answer. Of course, philosophical study itself might benefit of an addition of simple guiding lines in these matters – in spur of the moment, remembering a simple piece of wisdom might be easier than going through elaborate proof. Yet, mere sayings are still not enough, especially as, Seneca says, current times are perverted and so far from the natural way of life that every possible help is required for living well.

It seems no question of human condition was too small to interest Seneca, as he ponders even such problems whether it is best to read detached sentences from several books or concentrate your attention on few books. Indeed, he says, philosophy is not just a source for some isolated principles, but an example for molding your whole life.

But it is especially big questions of life that Seneca is interested of. One should live the life to utmost and take advantage of every moment, because death is something that is inevitably following everyone and may surprise us suddenly. And if one should live old enough, one should cherish every day even more and relish the days when the desires of youth have gone by. And when the time comes, one must seize the opportunity and leave the aching body behind without any care.

Seneca's advice to seize the day was especially meant to eradicate all fears of future disasters. Why should one be unhappy before an event has occurred? If one is complacent with the idea that even the seemingly worst fate of them all, that is, one's death, can be an honourable event and that death leads either to cessation of all experiences, good and bad alike, or to release of human mind from bondage of body, all reasons to fear vanish. A person who has truly understood this will remain indifferent to her outward conditions – whether he is sensually pleasured or tormented by pain, her state of mind will be unaffected. Even a loss of something dear, like a good friend or beloved child, is something she does not regret – at least she has not switched good to a devious friend and at least she has had the opportunity to enjoy the life of her child thus far. And all the seeming hardships of life she deems to be mere challenges set by god, in which she can show the strength of her character. Even if this seems like an ideal that one cannot truly perform, it is an idea that one should try to emulate as much as she can.

Even the most seemingly useful negative emotions prove to be disadvantageous on a closer look. Thus, while Aristotelians would have commended the emotion of anger, as long as it was kept under strict control, Seneca wants to have none of this, since giving even restricted freedom to rage means losing one's self-control. Indeed, it is some results of rage that are more to be commended, such as a brave stance towards injustice, but these can also be a consequence of a controlled mind. In fact, it is much better not to hate people, whom one punishes, since their crimes are just a sign of their lack of self-control. Especially important this ability to control one's anger and be merciful is to people with great power, since on their decision depends lives of many people.

A good question is whether it is at all possible then to get rid of such negative emotions like anger, when they seem to arise in us without any choice on our parts. Yet, Seneca suggests, it is only the first impulse that is generated naturally, but turning impulses into actions still requires our assent. We might weaken impulses through exercise, but most important remedy against e.g. angered behaviour is not to give in to impulses demanding such a behaviour. For instance, we should take time to let our first feelings cool and to reflect whether the thing that made us angry really is worth all the fuss.

The result of losing all these negative emotions, Seneca believed, was not a state of no emotions, but a state of full joy. It was a state in which one truly controlled oneself and felt happy about this self-control – and this was the true source of happiness. Thus, things like traveling can by themselves lead to no happiness, since the main source of human activity or person's own mind remains same throughout one's travels. Yet, this does not mean that a truly wise person would completely disparage all external matters – if it be in her power to choose, she will still e.g. prefer doing honourable deeds benefiting her family or country than to be assailed by sickness and pain, and she would gladly have riches, because she can use them for good purposes.

Although Seneca thus insisted that perfect living would imply taking control of oneself, he also admitted that some reactions of body can never be fully controlled. For instance, some people naturally blush in novel situations, but this is just due to an increase in blood flow and not to any weakness in their character. Similarly, although a perfectly wise person would feel joy when thinking of happy times spent with departed friends, the body might still force some tears to her eyes. Indeed, Seneca says, one should not take that much care of body – only a moderate exercise is enough, because one should concentrate more on the well-being of one's mind, which was the truly divine element in a person.

Seneca's ideas of social relations are ambiguous. On the one hand, one should avoid crowds, especially when they are engaging in some brutal and inhuman activity, like gladiator battles, which Seneca despised. One should even try to make oneself as uninteresting as possible in eyes of the people, in other words, live as unluxurious life as possible – at least one should from time to time try to live with just the barest essentials. Indeed, why should one gather much wealth, when needs of nature can be fulfilled so easily, and in case of total deprivation one can still leave the life? Equally unimportant is social status, since we all derive from the same stock, and it is quite unimportant if other people think less of you because of your status in life. Some might even say that low status means easier life, since one does not then need to care about envy of people – and one should not take slavery as a reason to not enjoy a person's company.

On the other hand, it is good to have companions whom you trust, whom you can help in their need and with whom you can share all that you have learned from the art of living. Indeed, a person who is still just learning the art of good life requires some guidance from other people. And even if truly well-living persons can spend their time happily with themselves and live their whole life as a hermit, they still prefer having around them people they like, since company of friends is a source of joy also. One should just not be beguiled to think that one needs a lot of riches to provide for one's friends, for true friends will remain one's friends, no matter what one's financial condition.

Seneca's opinion on political affairs is equally ambiguous. Surely a wise person should help the community in any way she can, but if the community does not want her advice and especially if it is ruled by power-hungry and self-seeking persons, there is no duty to take care of such a community. Then a wise person might as well spend her life quietly contemplating the wonders of the universe – that is also useful, since surely such divine works require some observer.

Compared to Seneca, Epictetus seems more like the traditional image of a Stoic – a former slave, who dedicated his life to teaching other people the secrets of philosophy. His main conviction on this score was that students often just tried to memorise sayings of famous philosophers, which in itself was still no philosophy – a true philosopher was known of his actions, not of his lectures.

Like Seneca before him, Epictetus spoke of all three traditional parts of Stoic philosophy. He didn't disparage even logic or study of what is true. Indeed, he despised all skeptical philosophers who had thrown away the greatest gift of human beings or the capacity for reasoning, which is the only true measure of truth. An irrational person or a person who falls for all sorts of false deductions has erred and should thus correct herself, even if an error in reasoning seems a less important thing than an error in behaviour. Even study of rhetoric was of some use, Epictetus thought, because clarity in speech made it more easy for others to understand you. Still, one should not confuse such preliminary studies with the genuine philosophy.

The use of the study of nature lies in Epictetus' view especially in the evidence that it offers for the existence of some artificer or god behind the whole world. God has created the world purposefully and has given every creature its share of natural capacities to use – even such a seemingly useless thing as a beard is valuable, since it is such a clear sign of gender, Epictetus claims. To human beings, god gave something divine, namely, reason. Thus, we should be proud of our own heritage, which ultimately leads to god, and at the same time, respect the value of other human beings, no matter what their station in life.

Just like with Seneca, the true value of philosophy, according to Epictetus, lies in the art of living – it is here that one's progress in study of philosophy is evaluated. Epictetus notes that the art of living is in a sense something that everyone must look for herself, because everyone has different capacities – for some people, it is good to humble oneself and carry the chamber pot of their superiors, for others, that would be a great insult and a reason to object one's superiors. Similarly, one cannot really condemn people for living badly, because it is not their fault if they haven't been taught the skills required for good life – a thief just hasn't been explained well, why she shouldn't continue in her ways.

Still, even if no detailed rules fit for everyone can be made, Epictetus is still willing to say something general about good life. There is only one thing we can control, he insists, namely, our attitude towards all what we perceive to happen, while everything else lies beyond our control. The rule of good life is then to aim to control what we can – that is, our attitudes toward everything – and not care about things we can never control, like riches and health. This is the only way to true freedom, Epictetus says, because true freedom requires complete control of oneself.

In other words, we should be cautious about things we can control and confidently bear things we cannot control. Among the things one cannot control is one's bodily appearance. Thus, Epictetus says, we should not spend our time for improving our appearance or lamenting our bodily health. Instead, one should make one's inner choices as beautiful as possible and bear one's illnesses as gracefully as possible. And if one's life becomes unbearable, one should always remember that in suicide lies the final escape route out of all miseries.

Among the things one cannot control are also the actions of others. What should if I care, if others despise or pity me? What should I care, if a powerful person threatens my external conditions or my body? What should I care, if someone else failed to live like a philosopher? All of these things are such that I have no say on them. Because the lure of other people is so enticing, Epictetus suggests that a philosopher-to-be should at first avoid large crowds and return to civilisation only after fortifying one's mind.

Although Epictetus did not place much value in community life, he did not want to make Stoics into complete hermits. Indeed, he says a philosopher should clean oneself, so as to be worthy of being called a human being – and not to repulse other persons from philosophy, because of the stench. Epictetus is also willing to disregard certain radical ideas on community life of earlier Stoics. For instance, when earlier Stoics had declared that all women should be communally owned, Epictetus points out that we still shouldn't touch a woman with a different husband, because it would also be rude to take one's seat in a theater, although neither of you exactly owns the seat.

Epictetus divides the learning to live well into three phases. Firstly, one should try to tame one's emotions, so that neither love nor hate would affect one's judgement in any manner. Secondly, one should know one's duties in relation to other persons and act according to them. Finally, one should cultivate one's faculty of judgement, so that one is always in a position to say what is good or bad, no matter whether one's faculties are in a good condition or not.

Epictetus held Cynics as an ideal of living well. He congratulated Diogenes as truly independent and thus kingly person, because Diogenes was never perturbed by sudden blows of fate, such as being captured by pirates, but treated them with the same disdain as all others. Epictetus himself admits that he has a long way to go, if he wants to achieve the ideal result.

While Seneca wrote long essays on various themes, teachings of Epictetus were collected by his student, Arrian, and were often quite short. Even more aphoristical are the writings of our final example of later Stoics, Marcus Aurelius, who is quite an extraordinary specimen – a ruler of the Roman empire. In contrast with his grand state, he begins his Meditations quite humbly by reminding himself how much he has gotten from people who have educated him and taught of the ways of good life.

Humble is also his view about his own mental capacities. Everything in human life seems like a fleeting opinion, nothing is certain and not just material world, but everything in human soul is flux, he says. Yet, this is all just indifferent, because important thing is to keep hold of what is truly essential in oneself and disregard everything else by severing ties to one's material side. Even if there were no divinities, it would be good to hold on to what seems divine in you and gain complete self-mastery. Yet, even though Marcus Aurelius is sure that there are divinities taking care of the world, this does not mean any change in one's ideal behaviour: it is still good to live as naturally as possible.

An important part of life, Marcus Aurelius says, is the inevitable loss of one's faculties due to old age. This is nothing to complain about, since decay is also a part of natural progress. Even death is nothing to complain about, since it is only dissolution and return of body to the material elements, from which it originally arose. Life is like a stage, and we just have to bow out of it, when our time comes – and who knows, we might have to play the same part again during the repeating cycles of the world, so we should better play our part well.

The fact of old age and death does mean that one should not waste time with anything that one cannot really control, such as thoughts of other people. Instead, one should concentrate on what is most noble in human beings, that is, their capacity to reflect on things. Reason should be put to good use by inspecting and accepting everything that happens around us – whatever happens is just part of the natural course of the world. Being disturbed of all the pain, decay and death is disrespectful of the powers controlling the world, since all these things form the natural cycle of the world. Of course, it is also natural that humans act against their better reason and are disrespectful of everything in their deeds and words. Thus, one should not be disturbed of the fact that some people cannot act in such a philosophical manner, even more so if oneself is also incapable of living all times like a philosopher.

The capacity to reflect gives us a constant resting place from the ordeals and pains of human life. If something disturbs you, Marcus Aurelius says, you have the power to change your opinion and conclude that it wasn't nothing to be disturbed of. It is oneself everyone should be trying to control, not others, who might always be beyond your power. Ironically, this ruler of Roman empire appears to think that one of the worst fates that can befall a human being is becoming an emperor. Still, if one has to take that position, one must hold that position like a philosopher would.

The existence of reason is something shared by all human beings. Thus, reason connects all human beings into one community. Similarly, the whole world forms a unity, in which all living beings should be respected. One should dedicate one's life to this cosmological community by accepting the fate universe has bestowed on one. In world, Marcus Aurelius says, things feed one another, thus, what seems death and destruction is actually just change of one shape of matter into another according to rules and laws of universe. Then again, just like an individual should help the (local or global) community, she should be ready to accept help from others, since a group of persons can achieve things that a single individual by herself couldn't.

Although Marcus Aurelius was a dedicated Stoic, his aphorisms show a bit of carelessness in the acceptance of Stoicism. Thus, he is quite indifferent about the question whether world is governed by a benevolent person or whether Epicureans were right in denying all intention about the behaviour of the world. Whatever the case, Marcus Aurelius says, we should still hold on to our independence and reason.

In a sense, this branch of Stoicism has taken to its inevitable conclusion the idea that philosophy is all about the art of living. This development is in a sense a natural concomitant of the growing independence of other fields of investigation, which is something I'll take a look at in my next post. And when philosophy became synonymous with ethics, it was deprived of all speculations concerning the nature of reality – who cares whether world is ruled by chaos, providence or necessity, as long as I can control myself? Yet, this void of speculation could not be left empty and in yet further posts we will see how philosophy was overtaken by religion.

Philosophy translated

All the philosophers thus far have spoken and written in Greek, even if they lived far away from Greek mainland. Philosophy, as we have faced it – this strange mix of a search for meaningful life and an investigation of truth – has been a unique part of Greek culture. This changed, when philosophical schools started to translate their theories to Rome.

At first, philosophy did not fair well in these new surroundings. There is a well known story of a group of philosophical ambassadors arriving in Rome. Carneades the Academic was one member of this group, and upon the day of their arrival, he made a touching speech about the usefulness of military prowess – a topic close to the heart of Romans. True to his habit of not asserting anything, Carneades made another speech the following day and this time insulted military prowess as the ultimate evil. Needless to say, Roman authorities were not pleased and banned the arrival of philosophers to Rome.

It is not certain how fabulous the story is, but it probably reflects a real tendency in Roman society. Greeks in general were considered effeminate and thus suspicious in the eyes of the masculine culture of Romans. Philosophy was considered nothing more than a further evidence of the perversity of Greeks – who on earth would spend considerable time in thinking such frivolities?

Of course, as time went by, Romans started to warm up to Greek learning. Thus, in few generations we find representatives of major philosophical schools using Latin in their writings. Even such highly infamous school as Epicureanism had its Roman follower, Lucretius. Basic opinions of Lucretius remained same as those of Epicurus, but some interesting differences of emphasis had occurred. While Epicurus himself was against too flowery teaching, Lucretius used his poetic skills for teaching philosophy. Indeed, he concentrated on the most epic theme in Epicurean philosophy, that is, physics or the study of the world and its birth, instead of the usual emphasis on ethical matters.

Lucretius spins a dramatic tale starting from the idea of atoms of different shapes flying around, all in straight line in infinite space. Suddenly, an atom changes its course, due to no reason at all, and bounces on other atoms, thus creating aggregates of atoms, like the elements or earth, water, air and fire. At first the elements are completely mixed, but the heavy earth finally takes up the middle point and the lighter elements are left to the outer remnants. Thus was finally born the world we know, and one day it will be destroyed, when the fight of the elements is finally canceled.

Spirit animating animals and humans is also in Epicurean theory an element consisting of atoms, and furthermore, such that can live only within a body – no afterlife in Epicurean philosophy, but then again, there's also nothing to worry about, no eternal pain after death. True, people do get visions of tormented souls, but these are just freak combinations of atoms striking our mind. In the beginning of the world, the earth itself had enough power to create combinations of spirit and other matter or living beings, but in time its power diminished and only those animals that could have offspring remained. For humans, this meant the beginning of a long progress towards civilization, through inventions like agriculture, metallurgy and social life. But far more important Lucretius considers the discoveries of Epicurus, who showed that many events apparently caused by gods were actually natural occurrences and hence no reason to fear divine wrath.

But it is not Lucretius one should take as the most important link between Greek and Latin philosophy. Instead, this epithet should be bestowed on Marcus Tullius Cicero, who actually began his career as an orator and a statesman in Roman republic and took to philosophy only later in his life, when he was effectively prevented from taking part in state life by machinations of Julius Caesar and his followers. His first literary works concerned rhetoric, a topic he had plenty of personal experience with, and therefore it is no wonder that he took a considerably more positive view of it than many earlier philosophers – rhetoric was a good instrument, if the user just was an upright citizen. Indeed, Cicero was of the opinion that originally rhetoric or oratory formed a complete whole with philosophy, as a general capacity to know how to live and to present one's wisdom to fellow citizens. Later philosophers had isolated some topics for pure research and ignored the need for defending them, and some (Epicureans) had even tried to escape the duty to serve others of their communities in their search for personal peace and contentment. True, philosophers like Stoics might have better arguments, but they lacked the means of making the crowd convinced – a criteria that was essential for evaluating the success of one's speech.

In comparison with philosophers, Cicero thought that orators had nothing to be shamed of. He even suggested that an ideal speaker, like the famous Greek orator, Demosthenes, should know of all sorts of things and be highly civilized. He should be well versed with logic and ethics (for instance, he should know that there are basically two sources of a decent human life: cultivation of one's intellectual capacities and harmonisation of desires under the guidance of intellect). Cicero still admitted that real speakers were often far from this ideal, but maintained that even they had to have some inkling of certain tricks of trade, like some basic human psychology and capacity of finding convincing arguments, even if rhetoric is more dependent on one having the capacities of a potential speaker. Furthermore, Cicero was convinced that oratory as a whole had developed in the sense that best speakers of earlier ages were mere babblers in comparison with best speakers of Cicero's day.

Cicero was in fact convinced that even in philosophy caring about the affairs of community is far more appropriate than losing oneself to the study of the wonders of nature. Indeed, he himself was highly interested of the question of the shape of an ideal community. Cicero basically accepted the Aristotelian idea of three paradigmatic forms of community: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. Of these, democracy does retain the liberty of every citizen, but often leads to a state of anarchy, when no one has a clear governing position, while monarchy and aristocracy are more efficient, but are in danger of being corrupted into tyrannies and oligarchies, just like happened with Roman monarchy. True solution would be a balanced community, with elements of all forms of government, which Cicero felt was embodied in republican Rome, in which consuls retained some of the monarchic power, while patrician senate and plebeian tribunal expressed aristocratic and democratic elements.

Quite traditionally, Cicero held that a balanced community – and indeed, any community, if it was to be community and not just an enslavement of people – would have to be based on justice, that is, on the principle that everyone was due to what she deserved. While Greek philosophers had to apply this principle in affairs of one city, Cicero as a citizen of an empire had to consider what justice means in international affairs. True to the mores of his time, Cicero could defend aggression of a state over another with the Aristotelian notion that some people just were more natural to rule, while the fate of others was to be ruled. Cicero also had to face the problem of different mores in different cultures, so obvious in an international empire like Rome – if different cultures thought different things good and evil, how could we defend justice as the guiding principle of all communities? Cicero's answer was that deep down all people must agree on some basic values, such as justice, because they were based on the nature of things and not on arbitrary cultural habits.

Just like Greek philosophers before him, Cicero was also certain that the good of a community relied not only on the structure of the society, but also on harmonising the actions of the community members. This harmonising then requires that the members have a state of mind geared towards community life, instead of just caring for themselves. As an incentive towards such a mindset, Cicero uses Plato's trick of suggesting a reward in the afterlife for all those who have lived well – a reason not to be intimidated of death nor of old age. Even if death were a mere annihilation of life and so all sensation, it would be nothing to be afraid of, since it would mean deliverance from all pain and would resemble deep sleep. But, Cicero argues, since human body appears to contain a divine element, as evidenced by the mental powers of human beings, this spark must not be hindered by the death of body. Instead, as it is made of finer elements than the coarse body, it will get to fly away from the insignificant speck that Earth is to the beauty of heavenly spheres. Thus, Cicero is willing to incorporate religious rituals to state life and so gain divine justification to it.

Cicero is also insistent that the harmony of the state is dependent especially on the state of its nobles – on the one hand, it's important that there is a class that has the means to understand the affairs of state better than the common people, on the other hand, this class should also work for the common good instead of their own advancement. Cicero especially emphasises the role of past great men of Rome as examples of good life. These past heroes knew that true worth of human life lies not in riches, but more in one's capacity to control oneself – riches and earthly goods are something that comes and goes and a person controlled by a desire for them is never satisfied, while a self-controlled person can never become unhappy, because of his ability to adjust to all circumstances. He would never be anxious or depressed about anything, because he would understand how small and meaningless all the seeming troubles of life are.

These statements of what good life is sound like they could have come out of the mouth of a Stoic. Indeed, like Stoics, Cicero was critical of the Epicurean philosophy. Epicurean physics Cicero despised completely. Atoms changing the direction of their movement just by accidence and complete worlds coming to be through pure chance were just too unbelievable doctrines in his eyes. And images of things far away floating around, pinging our bodies and causing us imagine things not actually present sounds convincing at first, but then you'd have to accept the existence of all sorts of fables, like centaurs and dragons.

Epicurean idea of gods Cicero thought especially ridiculous. Epicureans thought a god should be human in shape, because that was the only suitable form for reasoning, but this just made human ignorance into a general principle – and in any case, how could a thing in human form be anything but mortal? Furthermore, Epicureans thought that gods would do nothing and care for nothing and still be happy, but Cicero insisted that only an active life would be a happy life. Even worse, idea of such indifferent gods would mean end to all religion, because no one would feel any need to worship such gods. In any case, Cicero thought that it would have been easier if Epicureans had just denied the existence of gods altogether, since they just appeared to accept them because of common opinion.

Cicero had learned from Epicurean teachers and so knew more of their ethics than just the usual caricature – he was aware that Epicureans did not search for mere temporary delights of flesh, but like other major schools of philosophy, recommended a life of moderation, because only such promised stable pleasures. Yet, Cicero thought, Epicurus was trying to play with two sets of cards at the same time: on the one hand, he spoke of pleasure to entice people wanting to spend their life full of a variety of pleasant sensations, on the other hand, he acted as if greatest pleasure was just a life without pain in order to sound more respectable in philosophical circles. Epicurus even says that traditional virtues are good for pleasures (for instance, courage makes us feel less pain in adverse circumstances), but Cicero thinks this view distorts the true purpose of virtues, which are meant to serve the whole community, not just an individual. Indeed, a true Epicurean would be a complete egoist, and because Epicurus himself valued his friends, he must have been inconsistent.

Even though Cicero did agree with Stoics that Epicureans were a really bad school of philosophy and even used their terminology in a Latinized form, he still was no straightforward Stoic, but appropriated features of many philosophies into his worldview. Indeed, he didn't have a high opinion of Stoic logic or Stoic ideas of the natural world, thinking that Stoics had merely copied the ideas of their predecessors and in some cases had even regressed. At some point, Cicero especially criticized their ethics, which attempted to state paradoxical conclusions, such as the indifference of all except virtuous behaviour, but had to admit, like Platonists and Aristotelians had done earlier, that even Stoics thought it preferable to be healthy and of good means – in effect Cicero accused Stoics of using terminological quibbles to distinguish themselves from more adequate philosophers.

Cicero was especially interested of the New Academy, and like them, accepted that humans can usually achieve only probability, not true knowledge – at least if knowledge is defined in the manner Stoics had. The basis of all knowledge should be perceptions that accurately portray things they appear to present, Stoics say, but there is no way to discern such true perceptions from mere appearances, which might look essentially same as true perceptions. This doesn't mean that one should be completely blind about how to conduct one's live, Cicero says, because probability is enough for a decent life – indeed, even Stoics must admit that most people must do with mere probability, because knowledge is so rare.

Still, even in case of conduct Cicero finds at first that opinions of Plato and Aristotle were far more probable than Stoicism – Plato and Aristotle at least straightforwardly admitted that material things are goods and part of a happy life, they just weren't as good as mental fortitude. Stoics announced that pain was no evil, but such a statement would not help anything when one was actually feeling it. Far better in Cicero's opinion was to teach one to tolerate pain, just like a manly man can do – and if pain turns too strong to bear, there's always the possibility to escape to the netherworld. And while Stoics were satisfied to say that wise men never felt any distress, because they saw how unreasonable it is, this helps in no manner anyone wallowing in grief who does not fulfill the ideal of Stoic sage – instead, they should be led to reflect on the cause of their grief and note themselves its insignificance.

Yet, Cicero wouldn't have been a true Academician, if he couldn't have seen the other side of the debate also. While Aristotle was to be recommended for realizing the importance of sensuous goods and pains, Cicero was highly critical of his idea of best life being a sort of mean between two extremes. If someone was, say, even the slightest bit agitated out of anger, he might well be overwhelmed, if the emotion rose to a higher degree. Far better it would be, Cicero thought, to follow the Stoic ideal, in which all emotions should fall under perfect control of a person. Indeed, if even Epicureans, who laid all happiness in pleasure, said that a true philosopher was always happy and not shaken by anything, shouldn't disciples of Socrates be equally capable?

Similarly ambivalent was Cicero's attitude towards Stoic doctrine of gods. He did find appealing the idea of gods governing the world and taking care of human affairs. Yet, he found some severe inconsistencies in the Stoic teachings, arising mostly from their attempt, on the one hand, to base their notions of gods in clear reasoning, and on the other hand, to accommodate common notions of divinities. Even this dual attempt itself seems rather suspect in Cicero's eyes, since to rely on the ideas of common people e.g. in matters of divine existence appears so unphilosophical. Furthermore, to allow at least some gods of tradition into a philosophical system opens up a can of worms. Where to stop? Why accept only these gods and not all of those lesser demons? And why just Greek and Latin gods and not also gods of other people? In addition, as Greco-Roman religion had no accepted consensus on the different origin stories and genealogies of the gods, one could not form a consistent pantheon around them.

Even if Stoics would disentangle their view of gods from the common conceptions, it would face grave difficulties. Stoics thought that the ultimate god must be the whole world itself, since there can not be anything greater than world – world must, for instance, live and think, because it contains parts that live and think. Yet, Cicero noted, this type of reasoning is just false. A city or a nation is clearly greater than the individuals that constitute it, but still we do not admit that cities or nations would live or think. Cicero also noted that how hard it was to believe that this Stoic world god controlled all its parts perfectly and that it had arranged all the parts of the world and even human affairs as well as it could be. World god had given reason to humans, but these then went on to use it for all sorts of evil deeds – why not make humans good at the same time?

Cicero was particularly critical of the Stoic acceptance of divination. Firstly, Cicero thought that divination was either impossible or futile. Either there are things that happen by chance and then divination cannot happen, or then all events occur with utmost necessity and then it makes no sense to e.g. know of any future dangers, since one cannot avoid them in any manner. Furthermore, Cicero found all alleged instances of divination rather unconvincing. True, sometimes diviners and fortune tellers did make correct predictions, but at least as often they were completely wrong. One couldn't argue for divination from the acceptance of predictions of doctors, which also might go wrong sometimes, because doctors could rely on their knowledge of natural processes, while diviners could not really explain the mechanism by which the divination was supposed to work. Indeed, one could often hear one diviner interpreting some dream or other sign in a completely opposite way as another diviner – so flimsy is the connection between the supposed sign from gods and its meaning. One might even ask if it is unbecoming to gods to present their messages so unclearly.

In fact, Cicero was rather skeptical of the whole Stoic notion of an unyielding fate controlling everything that happens in the world. Clear problem such a fatalism was, because it appeared to cancel all possibility of humans freely choosing their actions. Cicero then suggested that one might instead accept the possibility of free actions and hence deny outright fatalism.

Cicero did not remain satisfied with mere criticism of famous schools of philosophy, but also developed his own stance on how one should live, in his last published book on duties. The first and foremost question in Cicero's eyes is what makes human life, not just distinct from, but also better than mere animal life. Cicero suggests rather traditionally that it is the human desire to know things that separates us from beasts and that should therefore be cultivated in greatest measure.

Yet, Cicero was no advocate of the ideal of a hermit philosopher, as we have clearly seen in his appraisal of community life. Indeed, as human community is based on such matters like communication, it is something that prominently separates us from beasts. Cicero thinks that nature has given for human beings an instinct to contact their fellows and make bonds with them, and this instinct should be followed – one should communicate with one's relatives, but also with friends and generally everyone in our community. Thus, people who shy away from communal life, because of their own interests, fail to do what they should, and even worse are people, like Caesar, who work actively against common interest, because of their own ambitions.

Respect for the communal life gives then various particular rules for people to follow, such as: we should respect the rights of other people for their own property, but we should also be willing to part of our own property for the benefit of others in our community. Yet, Cicero is not willing to give any definite rules, since in some cases we must break rules in order to avoid greater evil, just as when we must break a promise if obeying it would actually do more harm.

Furthermore, even though we should try to advance the interests of our own community, we should still also not do anything immoral against other communities, such as starting an unprovoked war against them. Indeed, one should show respect even to one's enemies and to one's servants and slaves, if one is to be a truly good person, Cicero continues.

Like many thinkers before him, Cicero considered masculine ideal of brave and unrelenting warrior, who despises all hardships and pains, to be worthy of following, although, again just like many previous thinkers, he would consider it a good thing only in service of the community. Furthermore, Cicero would note that such a courageous and stolid attitude could be shown even at times of peace, especially in political arena.

Search for knowledge, acknowledgment of the importance of social relations and a manly behaviour are for Cicero important ingredients of good human life, but in addition, one must also show a certain finesse in behaviour that is not easy to put in definite rules. One important element in Cicero's ideal is self-control – one should not be carried away by pleasures of senses or mind, whether it be wine or good humour, and especially one should shy away from things considered indecent by the community. Then again, this behavioural finesse requires also a possession of a clear character that one must follow – one must be oneself and act according to one's station in life. Here belong questions like what it is proper for one to wear and what kind of professions one should pursue. In these questions the social relations are also important, since one learns these unspoken rules of conduct by observing the behaviour of one's fellow citizens and especially of those considered to be especially good examples.

In addition to the question of how one should live one's life, Cicero also considers the question what is of benefit to a person. He suggests that while many things do help us, like the inanimate and animate goods of nature, it is especially other human beings who are of use to us, especially as many of the goods of nature must be first cultivated by humans. Of course, humans can also be of the greatest disadvantage to one another, but this just means that we should spend most of our time to get others co-operate with us. Indeed, in this sense the most advantageous way of life is just the one described above, in which one tries to live in service of one's community.

True to this opinion, Cicero did not allow any real conflict exist between the demands of how one should live and demands of what is truly advantageous: he thus finally accepts the Stoic position. One must think of one's friends, before trying to gain more wealth or power to oneself, and one must think of one's community, before helping one's friends. This still does not mean that one's duty would be always straightforward. For instance, we usually must keep our promises, but there appears to be cases where promises must be broken, such as when someone's life depends on it – here, one duty is cancelled by a higher duty. Cicero even notes that commitments to one's community might be overridden, if the community at stake uses perverted means to improve its positions, such as when it wages an unjust war against an innocent opponent. Thus, Cicero overcomes the restricted patriotism of a Roman gentleman and achieves a more cosmopolitan stand toward questions of politics.