This nature was in Plotinus' hierarchy something proceeding from the level of the soul, or energy projected by the world soul. On the level of souls, the hierarchy of observation and action was also present. Thus, Plotinus noted, people who are not capable of observing things in their mind and thus engaging in abstract sciences have to perform manual labour. Furthermore, even when people performed things physically and endeavoured after some end, this end was always some type of observation (for instance, we produce something because we want to see it before our eyes). Hence, the priority of observation was evident in Plotinus’ eyes.
While observation was the highest soul could achieve, it was the very essence of intellect in Plotinus’ hierarchy to observe itself and everything within itself. Of course, Plotinus noted that this wasn’t still the highest point in the hierarchy, because the primordial unity wouldn’t even need observation to be perfect - indeed, to be perfect it couldn’t have any multiplicity required even by self-observation and in no way it could contain all that exists, like the self-observation of intellect, although this primordial unity was the final source of everything.
Although the level of self-perceiving intellect and its ideas wasn’t the highest pinnacle in Plotinus’ hierarchy, it was the pinnacle of beauty. Indeed, he noted, an artist does not make beautiful works by choosing the appropriate matter e.g. for sculpture, but by imprinting a beautiful shape, existing already in her mind, to the material of the sculpture. Similarly, Plotinus thought, nature does not make beautiful things by choosing suitable material, but by projecting a beautiful shape on the material - what material does at most is to hinder the projection and lessen the beauty.
The self-thinking intellect then contains all these beautiful prototypes in a single act of self-thinking, thus being the pinnacle of all beauty. This shows us something important about the level of intellect in Plotinus’ hierarchy. The thinking of the intellect is not what we usually call thinking, that is, silent speaking of thoughts in our mind or an argument moving from premises to conclusion, which inevitably takes some time to occur. Instead, it is more like a momentary vision revealing all that is important in a single glance. Hence, intellect does not need to think all the beautiful prototypes one by one, but it at once has them all in front of mind’s eye. Furthermore, Plotinus thought that intellect also viewed these prototypes truly. Indeed, since they were not anything truly separate from the intellect, but merely aspects of the self-observation of intellect, there could be no room for false or incorrect observation of them.
Because of its beauty and truth, Plotinus called self-thinking intellect a god. Indeed, he compared it with Chronus, who held the middle place between his son Zeus (soul) and his father Uranus (primordial unity). According to Plotinus, this middle position made intellect unique and different from both soul and unity in the sense that only intellect found its complete perfection in observation. For “Zeus” or soul mere observation wasn’t enough, but it also regulated the world around it, while “Uranus” or primordial unity did not really need this observation for being perfect.
This primordial unity was something that defied all human characterisations. It had no limits, but it was equally wrong to call it infinitely large. It wasn’t contained in anything, although it in a sense potentially contained everything that ever was actually. One clear characteristic of this unity was its perfection or goodness, which was then something higher than mere beauty. In fact, Plotinus remarked, everything in the world strives for goodness, even when they sleep, while beauty interests only those who can observe things.
Three levels above corporeal world was enough for Plotinus: primordial unity, self-thinking intellect and soul. He was especially against gnostic teaching, where the number of entities was expanded beyond any need. For instance, beyond intellect one did not need any further entity conscious of intellect, because this role in the hierarchy was filled already by intellect itself, which could observe itself.
Gnosticism was to be rejected for other reasons also, although Plotinus noted that many of his friends had been lured by the ideas of gnostics. He was especially against the idea that corporeal world had been created through a mistake and that it was clearly evil in comparison with the spiritual world. Indeed, Plotinus noted that corporeal world was the best possible image of the best possible prototype, necessarily proceeding from the energy of this prototype.
Furthermore, while gnostics regarded the souls of gnostics as the only element of goodness in the corporeal world, Plotinus stated that many things were good and beautiful in it. For instance, stars and planets were in Plotinus’ eyes divinities, which were unencumbered by their bodies and could thus always observe the spiritual prototypes of the world. Even the unconscious nature was full of purpose and goodness and was guided by soul-like unconscious activity of nature.
Plotinus finally noted that gnostic ideas gave no guidelines how a person could improve herself - one was just born as spiritual or as corporeal and there was no escape from one’s fate. Indeed, gnostic could not care less about the fate of the body his soul inhabited, because it was a prison for the soul. Plotinus himself, on the other hand, did not regard embodiment of soul in such a low esteem, but as a necessary step in the development of the soul. Thus, by living with the body soul was meant to learn indifference toward material objects and thus rise to the level of stars.
Gnostics weren’t the only school of thought Plotinus engaged with. He was also quite interested of the Pythagorean question of the status of numbers in the hierarchy of existence. Plotinus noted that one could not simply identify numbers with other things, which we would do, for instance, if we placed existent things in an order and called first thing “one”, second “two” and so on. Such an identification would fail because number like “three” could be used of many things, not just of the third thing in that ontological order. Indeed, numbers had to precede all of these existent things, because one had to have e.g. a prototype of ten that could be applied to all combinations of ten things.
If Plotinus thought numbers were independent of things, he also though they were independent of any acts of calculation. Indeed, this was just a particular application of a general principle that something was in Plotinus’ opinion always prior to thinking of this something - e.g. the existence of movement was prior to thinking about the movement. This was even true of the self-thinking intellect, which contained all ideal prototypes within its act of self-thinking. Indeed, one could distinguish within this act various levels - the self-thinking intellect was e.g. living, but more essentially it was thinking and even more essentially existing. Numbers, then, Plotinus concluded, belonged to the level of existence of intellect. In fact, while primordial unity was for Plotinus something preceding in a sense existence, numbers preceded, according to him, the multiplicity of existents - one could say that while primordial unity had created all existence, numbers divided existence into separate entities.
A problem for this Plotinian understanding was provided by the seeming endlessness of all numbers. Because the ideal world of prototypes included in the act of self-thinking intellect contained numbers, there would have to be some perfect number containing all the existent prototypes of the ideal world. How could such a number exist if the number of numbers themselves couldn’t be pinned down? Plotinus appeared to suggest that such an imperfection concerned only souls in the material world. When we counted things, we could always find further and further numbers and no proper ending in the series. Similarly, while prototype of a line would have definite boundaries, lines in the corporeal world could apparently be extended as long as one liked.
Plotinus also noted that unlike in the intellectual level, where the numbers and quantities properly belonged, in the corporeal world things might often be numbered or quantified only accidentally. For instance, while a tree or an animal is naturally a unity, something like an army is a unity only accidentally, because the persons making up the army have no intrinsic connection to one another.
This possibility of an accidental quantification provided Plotinus with a possible answer for a question important in ancient philosophy: why do things far away from us seem smaller? Plotinus suggested as one alternative solution that from a distance we can gain information only of the essence of a visible object - in other words, its colour - while more accidental information, like the proper size of the object, are not properly transmitted to us.
Another topic, in which Plotinus noted the accidentality of quantity, was happiness. If we are happy now, this happiness is not diminished if it lasted only for a day. Indeed, even if we were happy for all eternity, the intensity of this happiness would not change in any manner. Otherwise, eternally happy entities, like stars, would never be completely happy, because they would be always becoming more and more happy.
Because quantities were part of the intellectual world, matter as such could not be quantitative, Plotinus concluded. This could even be empirically verified when a piece of papyrus was moistened by water - the whole papyrus became mixed with water, but the moist papyrus still took as much space as before. Plotinus explained this through the idea of featureless matter being formed by basic forces deriving from the intellectual level, such as forces making matter into watery or paper-like. The most central of these forces was the one involved in quantifying a piece of matter and giving it a certain volume. It was only this quantifying force that divided matter into individual bodies.
The intellectual level contained then numbers, but did it contain anything resembling corporeal entities? For instance, we know that Plotinus admitted the existence of a prototype of human beings, but would such a prototypical human sense anything? Yes, indeed, Plotinus would have answered, since even in the prototypical word of intellect one could perceive what the world is like, even if this perception was completely different from perception in corporeal world. Indeed, perception was not even the lowest activity at the intellectual level. Self-thinking intellect would think all types of beings in its self-thinking - even animals and plants - although these ideas of animals and plants would differ from corporeal animals and plants by being more prototypical and harmonious, both in themselves and in their mutual relations.
The prototypical nature of intellectual ideas requires some metaphorical light to be seen, Plotinus noted. This light, giving being to self-thinking intellect itself, derived of course from the primordial unity, which was then also the ultimate source of goodness. It was higher than mere intellect and it thus required something quite different from regular thinking to see it. Indeed, all it takes, Plotinus noted, is to immediately observe the unity, without thinking about it, but more like being swallowed by this unity. Indeed, Plotinus noted, since the primordial unity does not think, it cannot even consider things like “this is good”. Thus, one could just name this primordial unity good, reflecting the actual simplicity of primordial unity.
Plotinus also noted that unlike in the intellectual level, where the numbers and quantities properly belonged, in the corporeal world things might often be numbered or quantified only accidentally. For instance, while a tree or an animal is naturally a unity, something like an army is a unity only accidentally, because the persons making up the army have no intrinsic connection to one another.
This possibility of an accidental quantification provided Plotinus with a possible answer for a question important in ancient philosophy: why do things far away from us seem smaller? Plotinus suggested as one alternative solution that from a distance we can gain information only of the essence of a visible object - in other words, its colour - while more accidental information, like the proper size of the object, are not properly transmitted to us.
Another topic, in which Plotinus noted the accidentality of quantity, was happiness. If we are happy now, this happiness is not diminished if it lasted only for a day. Indeed, even if we were happy for all eternity, the intensity of this happiness would not change in any manner. Otherwise, eternally happy entities, like stars, would never be completely happy, because they would be always becoming more and more happy.
Because quantities were part of the intellectual world, matter as such could not be quantitative, Plotinus concluded. This could even be empirically verified when a piece of papyrus was moistened by water - the whole papyrus became mixed with water, but the moist papyrus still took as much space as before. Plotinus explained this through the idea of featureless matter being formed by basic forces deriving from the intellectual level, such as forces making matter into watery or paper-like. The most central of these forces was the one involved in quantifying a piece of matter and giving it a certain volume. It was only this quantifying force that divided matter into individual bodies.
The intellectual level contained then numbers, but did it contain anything resembling corporeal entities? For instance, we know that Plotinus admitted the existence of a prototype of human beings, but would such a prototypical human sense anything? Yes, indeed, Plotinus would have answered, since even in the prototypical word of intellect one could perceive what the world is like, even if this perception was completely different from perception in corporeal world. Indeed, perception was not even the lowest activity at the intellectual level. Self-thinking intellect would think all types of beings in its self-thinking - even animals and plants - although these ideas of animals and plants would differ from corporeal animals and plants by being more prototypical and harmonious, both in themselves and in their mutual relations.
The prototypical nature of intellectual ideas requires some metaphorical light to be seen, Plotinus noted. This light, giving being to self-thinking intellect itself, derived of course from the primordial unity, which was then also the ultimate source of goodness. It was higher than mere intellect and it thus required something quite different from regular thinking to see it. Indeed, all it takes, Plotinus noted, is to immediately observe the unity, without thinking about it, but more like being swallowed by this unity. Indeed, Plotinus noted, since the primordial unity does not think, it cannot even consider things like “this is good”. Thus, one could just name this primordial unity good, reflecting the actual simplicity of primordial unity.
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