Science and learning in antiquity

The general tendency of ancient Greek and Roman thought has been to associate philosophy with the practice of good life and the ability to pursue such a life, although we have seen Aristotle instead relating the highest philosophy to theoretical knowledge of certain key elements of the world. Still, philosophy of the ancients was not completely separate from the questions of science, or learning in general, and for instance, early Stoics thought that full knowledge of the world and its ways was at least a necessary precondition of perfectly good life. Thus, it is justifiable to investigate Greek science and learning to shed some light on the ancient philosophy.

By far the most developed science of ancient times was mathematics. We often hear of the external form of Euclidean mathematics, which supposedly derives everything from self-evident axioms and definition through incontestable demonstrations. All of this sounds like Greek mathematics would have been quite formal and removed from ordinary experience. Yet, when we look at e.g. Euclid's Elements, we quickly find that Greek mathematics was quite heavily linked to experience. Just think about some key proofs at the beginning of the first book: Euclid asks us to move one triangle on top of another triangle and thus to conclude that the two triangles coincide. This is a primary manner in which the similar magnitude of areas is seen – through quite concrete experiment. In fact, many of the more complex proofs dealing with areas work by cutting compared areas to pieces that we could then know to be similar by relying on some previous propositions – and ultimately on direct observation. This is in fact the manner in which Euclid proves the most famous theory of elementary geometry, the Pythagorean formula.

Although Euclid called his book Elements, an average modern reader would probably find only the first book filled with recognisable questions of elementary geometry: when are triangles similar, what is the sum of the angles in a triangle, how are the angles generated by parallel line related etc.? The second book already opens up avenues unfamiliar from geometry. The book apparently deals with rectangles, but the true topic of the book are certain equations of algebra. Ancient mathematicians had as yet no way to express complex calculations in any other way than through geometric means – squaring through actual squares, multiplication through rectangles. Thus, a simple task of squaring the sum of two magnitudes was represented as a square made out of a line combined of two smaller lines – and the result was then shown to consist of two smaller squares, with sides equal to the smaller lines, together with two rectangles formed by same two lines.

The need to express such equations explains also certain uses of circle by ancient mathematicians. Circle was, of course, important because it provided a way to copy a length of one line to another place. It was also a source for more intricate tools. At the very end of the third book of Elements, Euclid proves that no matter what sort of lines you draw, from a spot outside the circle, towards the circle and cutting it in two places, the rectangle formed by the first line between the spot and the first cutting place and the second line between the two cutting places is always of the same size – and if the line merely touches the circle, the square formed by the line between the spot and the touching place equals all these rectangles. This at first somewhat uninteresting result works in many proofs as a convenient trick e.g. to express some multiples as squares.

The fourth book of Elements continues the study of circles, and its topic is especially drawing figures of certain shape within and around circles. While at first this might seem rather unimportant pursuit, fit only for decorative purposes, it is actually of utmost importance at least in two cases. Firstly, it gives a convenient manner to divide the circumference of circle to equal parts – something which is especially useful for astronomical purposes. Secondly, it can be used to estimate the area of circle. The latter case deserves a more thorough explanation.

Elements is not precisely meant to provide for exact formulas for measurement. Instead, it gives exact means for measuring relations between different geometrical objects. In fact, the fifth book contains a theory of ratios between different magnitudes – that is, it tells us when a pair of number is related exactly in the same manner as another pair and when the pair has a larger or smaller ratio than the other pair. This is convenient in case of estimating magnitude of figures that one cannot express through simple algebraic means. For instance, in the sixth book Euclid can show that two circles have the exactly same ratio as squares on their diameters. Here Euclid is helped by what is called a method of exhaustion. By drawing polygons within and around the circles, he points out that their ratios provide limits between which the ratios of the circles must fall – and because every other ratio exceeds limits given by some of these polygons, the only alternative is the one already mentioned.

Elements is then a book on two-dimensional geometry, but it is also a book on arithmetics – or at least for certain arithmetical principles. Euclid doesn't go so far as to do exact calculations, but we do know from other sources that actual counting at antiquity was rather cumbersome. Instead, in the seventh, eighth and ninth book of Elements Euclid explicates such trivialities as ”odd times even is even”, but also goes through very intricate truths about number, for instance, that there is no highest prime number.

This theory of numbers provides also a ground for Euclid's theory of rational and irrational quantities, which is developed in the tenth book. The notion of ratios provides again a starting point: we just choose some magnitude as rational and then all magnitudes of same type that have the same ratio to the rational magnitude as a number has to another number are rational, while other magnitudes of same type are irrational. Since it is especially geometric magnitudes, or lines and areas, Euclid deals with, he makes the somewhat confusing choice that even all lines with rational squares should be called rational. Going through various relations between lines and areas, Euclid provided a crude classification of all irrationals, only to conclude that his classification fails to account for all irrationals.

The final three books of Elements extend the geometrical account to three-dimensional cases. What is most intriguing is perhaps the manner in which Euclid defines the various three-dimensional shapes through a method for their construction, for instance, when a circle is thought as moving around one of its diameters, a sphere is formed. The actual propositions of the last books are mostly rather uninspiring: we are shown in a similar manner to two-dimensional cases what are the relations of e.g. pyramids and rectangular solids with same bases and same height and we see that relations of cones and cylinders can then be determined through the method of exhaustion. The final book still closes with a true high note, when Euclid shows how to inscribe all the five Platonic shapes into balls and demonstrates that the sides of these shapes must be certain irrationals.

All the things in the two-dimensional part of Elements are accomplished through circles and straight line. In later mathematics, this was made a sort of virtue, but it seems clear that at least not all ancient mathematicians did not put as strict limits to mathematics. This is shown even by Euclid's three-dimensional mathematics and its method of constructing three-dimensional shapes, but even more clearly by the ancient treatises of various types of curves, most interesting of which are possibly the conic sections, which get their names from being generated by planes cutting the cones in different angles. The use of conic section is, once again, not arbitrary, but important e.g. for expressing relations between one- and two-dimensional magnitudes.

Another interesting point in ancient mathematics is Arhcimedes' account of how to calculate various curvilinear areas and volumes. On some level, not much has changed from Euclidean account of finding relations that hold e.g. between circles. In many cases Archimedes even uses the same method of exhaustion Euclid had applied. For instance, when trying to determine the segment of a parabola, Archimedes shows that we can limit the area of the segment through sums of triangles, and by making the triangles smaller and smaller the limits become closer and closer to a certain area. But Archimedes had also another type of proof for such theories – he showed that when put to a lever the segment could be balanced with a triangle of a certain area, which was then equal to the segment. In other words, Archimedes used mechanical principles to determine an answer to a mathematical problem. As he himself testifies, this mostly just helped him to discover the areas, but he didn't accept it as a proper proof, which could be determined only through mathematical means.

Although Archimedes did use then mechanics as a tool in mathematics, more familiar is his application of mathematics in mechanics. There was considerable interest on mechanical questions even before Archimedes, as shown by a work on mechanical problems, attributed to Aristotle, but in a sense, in Archimedes the ancient tradition of mechanics culminated. Especially important in this context is the notion of a centre of gravity, that is, a place to which we can think that the whole weight of a body is concentrated. Through this notion Archimedes can prove a number of important mechanical principles, such as the lever law – the longer the stick the more weight you can lift. Note how close to practice the Archimedean practice of mechanics is – it is all about making machines, like levers and pulleys.

Even more important field of application for mathematics was the study of stars and their comings and goings. Here especially the study of circles and angles was of primary importance. Earth and the universe were pictured as a sphere within a sphere. By carefully noting the distances between places, measuring differences of shadows and the places of stars in the sky, one could get a reasonable model of the place of the Earth in relation to the universe. Then by following the changes in the positions of the stars, and especially of the strangest of these, that is, planets, and by assuming that the movements of all heavenly objects must be somehow based on circles, Ptolemy constructed a reasonably accurate model of planetary movement.

Ancient thinkers were not satisfied with mere modelling of planetary movement, but they also tried to explain this phenomenon. The basic notions were simplistically mechanical or then compared the movement of stars to movements of animal things. Whatever the case, the stars themselves and their movement was supposed to have an effect on Earthly things through their pressure on Earth's atmosphere. Such influences were also felt to be a justification for attempts to predict key events in human life.

In addition to these astrological considerations, study of stars was quite useful in making maps – one can use the positions of stars in the night sky for approximating one's position on the globe. Here ancient mathematical learning came in contact with ancient empirical knowledge. One cannot say that Greeks and Romans would not have appreciated empirical learning. Quite the contrary, as Strabo's geographical writings and Pliny's collection of all sorts of interesting factoids show.

What was lacking was such technological advances like telescope and microscope, which have allowed us to see farther and in more detail. Also, the lack of trustworthy and fast communications often made it impossible to verify the facts collected, which makes these empirical compilations into an often tantalising mix of truths and fairy tales. One can see that there was e.g. great technological expertise on various special subjects, such as metallurgy, but this expertise was dispersed to many different individuals – while one person could know everything of, say, gold and its behaviour, he might have no idea about forging iron.

While ancient culture did have empirically discovered information on many questions of nature, the role of theoretical foundation of such information was rather ambiguous, reflecting the conflicts between various philosophical schools. The complex interactions between theory and empiria and many viewpoints on these interactions can be well exemplified through the difference of ancient schools of medicine. We have methodists, who were affiliated with the Pyrrhonic school and who accepted only some rules of thumb that had appeared to work in previous occasions. We have empiricists, who accepted immediate appearances and experiences as a tool for suggesting treatment, but who denied the possibility of any knowledge on the hidden causes of various diseases. And there were various rationalist schools, who attempted to justify their procedures through some theoretical framework, although what was a correct theory of human body was a point hotly debated.

Probably the most famous of these researchers of medicine was Galen, whose position was somewhere between empirical and rational schools. Galen despised methodists, whom he thought as mere bunglers and frauds. He was quite sympathetic of empiricists and admitted that in many cases empirical observations were enough for discovering a good treatment. He endorsed the rationalist ideal of a science of medicine based on certain foundations, but only if the foundations were correct. His preferred theory of human body was quite Aristotelian: the constituents of human body were characterised by four qualities (hotness, dryness, coldness and wetness), and if some quality took a too forceful position in some part of the body, causing imbalance and disharmony, a proper treatment was to apply opposed quality.

While Galenian medicine thus offered a comprehensive account of the biological make-up of human body, rhetoric was at least advertised as a comprehensive account of the cultural side of human beings. On the superficial level, the topic of the rhetoric is much more restricted – the production of speeches, and especially of speeches meant to be used in a court setting. Thus, the central aim of ancient rhetoric was to show how to invent good arguments for one's position, how to arrange these arguments into a coherent whole, how to express this whole in a good style, how to memorise the written speech and how to present it in a compelling manner.

Yet, writers like Cicero and Quintilian were eager to suggest that rhetoric was something more, namely the lost half of philosophy. That is, they pictured a time, when philosophical study of truths and especially of truths concerning good human life and rhetorical expertise of expressing those truths were an undivided unity. A conclusion they both draw was that a good rhetorician should also be a good person and know all the intricacies of human life.

An important part in rhetoric, Quintilian suggested was then the education of a future rhetoric. As it should be evident from his wide definition of rhetoric, Quntilian plans a careful curriculum for his imaginary students who wish to learn ,not just the tricks of the trade, but also the rudiments for becoming an ideal speaker. It appears that an ideal speaker should learn as much a possible from every topic – even if her skills are to be used in the courthouse, it is a definite possibility that some case would require expertise knowledge of some special topic. In addition to specialised knowledge, the rhetorician-to-be should also learn history, since past events often play part in modern cases. A special place in the curriculum is given to literature, which at the same time teaches the students the basics of good language, but also suggests various examples of human behaviour.

Quintilian's school of rhetoric incorporates then two important pieces of humanist learning: history and literature, both of which were important fields of study in antiquity. Study of history in ancient Greece and Rome was in a sense something quite different from academic history of our time. The ancient historians had progressed not much beyond mere chronicling of events. Often their standards of criticism were quite suspect. As a case in point, we might raise the historian of philosophy, Diogenes Laërtius, whose work is at worst a rambling collection of anecdotes from the lives of philosophers, without a proper explanation of their philosophies. The main historical guide line of Diogenes is the notion of one philosopher being a student of another, which allows him to create two lines of thinkers, but fails in explaining how the ideas of earlier philosophers led to ideas of future philosophers.

As for study of different types of literature, a scholarly criticism was quite developed. As an example, we might pick out the investigation of works of Aristotle, ancient commentaries on which could have filled libraries. An important example of this tradition is Alexander of Aphrodisias, who apparently set out to explain all of Aristotle's extant works, although only a handful of his commentaries have been passed down to us. And explain he does. Following through Aristotle's account of different types of deductions, Alexander goes carefully through every reasoning and every example Aristotle uses, expanding Aristotle's sometimes rather summarised sentences.

In some cases, Alexander picks on details that Aristotle probably did not mean as important. Why did Aristotle choose to present the three different figures of syllogisms in a certain order, Alexander asks. Pretty clearly the first figure is most important, because it is the only one allowing us to prove universal and affirmative propositions, required in scientific reasoning. Alexander takes this line of thought further and suggests that second figure, leading only to negative conclusions, is second best, because it can be used in philosophical debates, meant for refuting the ideas of opponents – and the third figure is then worst, leading only to particular conclusions and thus useful only in sophistical reasoning, in which propositions applying merely for particular cases are deceptively presented as holding in general.

At times, Alexander defends Aristotle against later critics. For instance, some Stoics had claimed that Aristotle went wrong in assuming that one cannot deduce impossibilities out of possibilities, because a possible statement ”Dion is dead” implied a statement ”he is dead” (”he” referring to Dion), but since the Greek term for ”he” could be used only of living persons, the implied statement was always an impossibility. Alexander noted that, if Stoics were correct in their grammar, then the first statement simply did not imply the latter. Furthermore, he pointed out that since Stoics believed in eternal recurrence of all things, death was always only a temporary state and one could refer to a dead person with a pronoun.

Alexander also opposed Stoics on their understanding of negation. Stoics had suggested that ”Socrates is not white” is not the negation of ”Socrates is white”, because both of these presuppose that Socrates exist, while ”It is not so that Socrates is white” does not, making it the sought-out negation. Alexander pointed out that a proper name did not necessarily refer to an existing entity, like in a sentence ”My future son will be called Eric”, which made Stoic assumption doubtful.

At other times, Alexander tried to show that certain innovations of later logicians were already accounted for by Aristotle. Thus, he attempts to show that a deduction consisting of nothing else but conditionals (”if A then B, if B then C, thus, if A then C”) must still follow syllogistic rules, because the premisses must have been ultimately deduced syllogistically.

Sometimes Alexander went clearly too far in his attempt to speak for Aristotle. A good example is latter's attempt to add necessity and possibility in his logic. Aristotle's efforts become quickly a hopeless muddle, when he distinguished many different meanings of possibility or contingency and then himself confused these various meanings from time to time. Alexander's valiant effort to make sense out of it manages just to muddle the issue even further.

The Stoic Attitude

Although we've seen philosophic schools like Epicureans and Academics find followers in Rome, by the time of Imperial Rome it was definitely the Stoic school that had the most prominent and influential members – take for instance, Seneca, famous as a minister for the emperor Nero.

It was a clear need for education that drew Seneca to philosophy. He admits that learning anything for the sake of profit is not worth the time of a gentleman – a common attitude among ancient philosophers. But not even the usual studies of nobility of his time satisfied Seneca. Grammar and poetry are of no consequence in matters of life, and neither is music. Mathematics can be useful in ascertaining the lay of my lands, but this does not still tell me whether I should own land at all. And even if astrological predictions are true, it is of no use to know my future, if I cannot avoid it.

Even all areas of philosophy were not so important in Seneca's eyes. Logic he especially regarded as often concerning itself with mere trivialities. What does it help to know in how many ways word “friend” is used, if it does not tell us what to do to a friend? Seneca ridicules even the seemingly clever syllogisms of Zeno and other Stoics, who try to prove great ethical truths with simple logical tricks. Even worse is to spend time thinking about fallacies like Liar's paradox – learning about such mistakes in reasoning does not advance us at all in what is truly important in our life.

Yet, abstract reasoning about genera and meaning of being might have a place in life, Seneca admits, for if one is to be entertained, one might even at least train one's mind with one's entertainment. And at least Platonic idea of true being residing in something covered by reasoning shows us not to hold things of sense world in great value.

Questions about nature Seneca found somewhat more interesting, and he even compiled a treatise of curiosities of natural phenomena. Although interesting in themselves, these phenomena also point to some builder behind all these wonders, who shares a similar relation to world than soul to its body. The existence of such a creative intelligence suggests to Seneca that life of a person continues, even when separated from its dying body.

But it was especially the question of how to live that interested Seneca and one that he thought philosophy was especially fit to answer. Of course, philosophical study itself might benefit of an addition of simple guiding lines in these matters – in spur of the moment, remembering a simple piece of wisdom might be easier than going through elaborate proof. Yet, mere sayings are still not enough, especially as, Seneca says, current times are perverted and so far from the natural way of life that every possible help is required for living well.

It seems no question of human condition was too small to interest Seneca, as he ponders even such problems whether it is best to read detached sentences from several books or concentrate your attention on few books. Indeed, he says, philosophy is not just a source for some isolated principles, but an example for molding your whole life.

But it is especially big questions of life that Seneca is interested of. One should live the life to utmost and take advantage of every moment, because death is something that is inevitably following everyone and may surprise us suddenly. And if one should live old enough, one should cherish every day even more and relish the days when the desires of youth have gone by. And when the time comes, one must seize the opportunity and leave the aching body behind without any care.

Seneca's advice to seize the day was especially meant to eradicate all fears of future disasters. Why should one be unhappy before an event has occurred? If one is complacent with the idea that even the seemingly worst fate of them all, that is, one's death, can be an honourable event and that death leads either to cessation of all experiences, good and bad alike, or to release of human mind from bondage of body, all reasons to fear vanish. A person who has truly understood this will remain indifferent to her outward conditions – whether he is sensually pleasured or tormented by pain, her state of mind will be unaffected. Even a loss of something dear, like a good friend or beloved child, is something she does not regret – at least she has not switched good to a devious friend and at least she has had the opportunity to enjoy the life of her child thus far. And all the seeming hardships of life she deems to be mere challenges set by god, in which she can show the strength of her character. Even if this seems like an ideal that one cannot truly perform, it is an idea that one should try to emulate as much as she can.

Even the most seemingly useful negative emotions prove to be disadvantageous on a closer look. Thus, while Aristotelians would have commended the emotion of anger, as long as it was kept under strict control, Seneca wants to have none of this, since giving even restricted freedom to rage means losing one's self-control. Indeed, it is some results of rage that are more to be commended, such as a brave stance towards injustice, but these can also be a consequence of a controlled mind. In fact, it is much better not to hate people, whom one punishes, since their crimes are just a sign of their lack of self-control. Especially important this ability to control one's anger and be merciful is to people with great power, since on their decision depends lives of many people.

A good question is whether it is at all possible then to get rid of such negative emotions like anger, when they seem to arise in us without any choice on our parts. Yet, Seneca suggests, it is only the first impulse that is generated naturally, but turning impulses into actions still requires our assent. We might weaken impulses through exercise, but most important remedy against e.g. angered behaviour is not to give in to impulses demanding such a behaviour. For instance, we should take time to let our first feelings cool and to reflect whether the thing that made us angry really is worth all the fuss.

The result of losing all these negative emotions, Seneca believed, was not a state of no emotions, but a state of full joy. It was a state in which one truly controlled oneself and felt happy about this self-control – and this was the true source of happiness. Thus, things like traveling can by themselves lead to no happiness, since the main source of human activity or person's own mind remains same throughout one's travels. Yet, this does not mean that a truly wise person would completely disparage all external matters – if it be in her power to choose, she will still e.g. prefer doing honourable deeds benefiting her family or country than to be assailed by sickness and pain, and she would gladly have riches, because she can use them for good purposes.

Although Seneca thus insisted that perfect living would imply taking control of oneself, he also admitted that some reactions of body can never be fully controlled. For instance, some people naturally blush in novel situations, but this is just due to an increase in blood flow and not to any weakness in their character. Similarly, although a perfectly wise person would feel joy when thinking of happy times spent with departed friends, the body might still force some tears to her eyes. Indeed, Seneca says, one should not take that much care of body – only a moderate exercise is enough, because one should concentrate more on the well-being of one's mind, which was the truly divine element in a person.

Seneca's ideas of social relations are ambiguous. On the one hand, one should avoid crowds, especially when they are engaging in some brutal and inhuman activity, like gladiator battles, which Seneca despised. One should even try to make oneself as uninteresting as possible in eyes of the people, in other words, live as unluxurious life as possible – at least one should from time to time try to live with just the barest essentials. Indeed, why should one gather much wealth, when needs of nature can be fulfilled so easily, and in case of total deprivation one can still leave the life? Equally unimportant is social status, since we all derive from the same stock, and it is quite unimportant if other people think less of you because of your status in life. Some might even say that low status means easier life, since one does not then need to care about envy of people – and one should not take slavery as a reason to not enjoy a person's company.

On the other hand, it is good to have companions whom you trust, whom you can help in their need and with whom you can share all that you have learned from the art of living. Indeed, a person who is still just learning the art of good life requires some guidance from other people. And even if truly well-living persons can spend their time happily with themselves and live their whole life as a hermit, they still prefer having around them people they like, since company of friends is a source of joy also. One should just not be beguiled to think that one needs a lot of riches to provide for one's friends, for true friends will remain one's friends, no matter what one's financial condition.

Seneca's opinion on political affairs is equally ambiguous. Surely a wise person should help the community in any way she can, but if the community does not want her advice and especially if it is ruled by power-hungry and self-seeking persons, there is no duty to take care of such a community. Then a wise person might as well spend her life quietly contemplating the wonders of the universe – that is also useful, since surely such divine works require some observer.

Compared to Seneca, Epictetus seems more like the traditional image of a Stoic – a former slave, who dedicated his life to teaching other people the secrets of philosophy. His main conviction on this score was that students often just tried to memorise sayings of famous philosophers, which in itself was still no philosophy – a true philosopher was known of his actions, not of his lectures.

Like Seneca before him, Epictetus spoke of all three traditional parts of Stoic philosophy. He didn't disparage even logic or study of what is true. Indeed, he despised all skeptical philosophers who had thrown away the greatest gift of human beings or the capacity for reasoning, which is the only true measure of truth. An irrational person or a person who falls for all sorts of false deductions has erred and should thus correct herself, even if an error in reasoning seems a less important thing than an error in behaviour. Even study of rhetoric was of some use, Epictetus thought, because clarity in speech made it more easy for others to understand you. Still, one should not confuse such preliminary studies with the genuine philosophy.

The use of the study of nature lies in Epictetus' view especially in the evidence that it offers for the existence of some artificer or god behind the whole world. God has created the world purposefully and has given every creature its share of natural capacities to use – even such a seemingly useless thing as a beard is valuable, since it is such a clear sign of gender, Epictetus claims. To human beings, god gave something divine, namely, reason. Thus, we should be proud of our own heritage, which ultimately leads to god, and at the same time, respect the value of other human beings, no matter what their station in life.

Just like with Seneca, the true value of philosophy, according to Epictetus, lies in the art of living – it is here that one's progress in study of philosophy is evaluated. Epictetus notes that the art of living is in a sense something that everyone must look for herself, because everyone has different capacities – for some people, it is good to humble oneself and carry the chamber pot of their superiors, for others, that would be a great insult and a reason to object one's superiors. Similarly, one cannot really condemn people for living badly, because it is not their fault if they haven't been taught the skills required for good life – a thief just hasn't been explained well, why she shouldn't continue in her ways.

Still, even if no detailed rules fit for everyone can be made, Epictetus is still willing to say something general about good life. There is only one thing we can control, he insists, namely, our attitude towards all what we perceive to happen, while everything else lies beyond our control. The rule of good life is then to aim to control what we can – that is, our attitudes toward everything – and not care about things we can never control, like riches and health. This is the only way to true freedom, Epictetus says, because true freedom requires complete control of oneself.

In other words, we should be cautious about things we can control and confidently bear things we cannot control. Among the things one cannot control is one's bodily appearance. Thus, Epictetus says, we should not spend our time for improving our appearance or lamenting our bodily health. Instead, one should make one's inner choices as beautiful as possible and bear one's illnesses as gracefully as possible. And if one's life becomes unbearable, one should always remember that in suicide lies the final escape route out of all miseries.

Among the things one cannot control are also the actions of others. What should if I care, if others despise or pity me? What should I care, if a powerful person threatens my external conditions or my body? What should I care, if someone else failed to live like a philosopher? All of these things are such that I have no say on them. Because the lure of other people is so enticing, Epictetus suggests that a philosopher-to-be should at first avoid large crowds and return to civilisation only after fortifying one's mind.

Although Epictetus did not place much value in community life, he did not want to make Stoics into complete hermits. Indeed, he says a philosopher should clean oneself, so as to be worthy of being called a human being – and not to repulse other persons from philosophy, because of the stench. Epictetus is also willing to disregard certain radical ideas on community life of earlier Stoics. For instance, when earlier Stoics had declared that all women should be communally owned, Epictetus points out that we still shouldn't touch a woman with a different husband, because it would also be rude to take one's seat in a theater, although neither of you exactly owns the seat.

Epictetus divides the learning to live well into three phases. Firstly, one should try to tame one's emotions, so that neither love nor hate would affect one's judgement in any manner. Secondly, one should know one's duties in relation to other persons and act according to them. Finally, one should cultivate one's faculty of judgement, so that one is always in a position to say what is good or bad, no matter whether one's faculties are in a good condition or not.

Epictetus held Cynics as an ideal of living well. He congratulated Diogenes as truly independent and thus kingly person, because Diogenes was never perturbed by sudden blows of fate, such as being captured by pirates, but treated them with the same disdain as all others. Epictetus himself admits that he has a long way to go, if he wants to achieve the ideal result.

While Seneca wrote long essays on various themes, teachings of Epictetus were collected by his student, Arrian, and were often quite short. Even more aphoristical are the writings of our final example of later Stoics, Marcus Aurelius, who is quite an extraordinary specimen – a ruler of the Roman empire. In contrast with his grand state, he begins his Meditations quite humbly by reminding himself how much he has gotten from people who have educated him and taught of the ways of good life.

Humble is also his view about his own mental capacities. Everything in human life seems like a fleeting opinion, nothing is certain and not just material world, but everything in human soul is flux, he says. Yet, this is all just indifferent, because important thing is to keep hold of what is truly essential in oneself and disregard everything else by severing ties to one's material side. Even if there were no divinities, it would be good to hold on to what seems divine in you and gain complete self-mastery. Yet, even though Marcus Aurelius is sure that there are divinities taking care of the world, this does not mean any change in one's ideal behaviour: it is still good to live as naturally as possible.

An important part of life, Marcus Aurelius says, is the inevitable loss of one's faculties due to old age. This is nothing to complain about, since decay is also a part of natural progress. Even death is nothing to complain about, since it is only dissolution and return of body to the material elements, from which it originally arose. Life is like a stage, and we just have to bow out of it, when our time comes – and who knows, we might have to play the same part again during the repeating cycles of the world, so we should better play our part well.

The fact of old age and death does mean that one should not waste time with anything that one cannot really control, such as thoughts of other people. Instead, one should concentrate on what is most noble in human beings, that is, their capacity to reflect on things. Reason should be put to good use by inspecting and accepting everything that happens around us – whatever happens is just part of the natural course of the world. Being disturbed of all the pain, decay and death is disrespectful of the powers controlling the world, since all these things form the natural cycle of the world. Of course, it is also natural that humans act against their better reason and are disrespectful of everything in their deeds and words. Thus, one should not be disturbed of the fact that some people cannot act in such a philosophical manner, even more so if oneself is also incapable of living all times like a philosopher.

The capacity to reflect gives us a constant resting place from the ordeals and pains of human life. If something disturbs you, Marcus Aurelius says, you have the power to change your opinion and conclude that it wasn't nothing to be disturbed of. It is oneself everyone should be trying to control, not others, who might always be beyond your power. Ironically, this ruler of Roman empire appears to think that one of the worst fates that can befall a human being is becoming an emperor. Still, if one has to take that position, one must hold that position like a philosopher would.

The existence of reason is something shared by all human beings. Thus, reason connects all human beings into one community. Similarly, the whole world forms a unity, in which all living beings should be respected. One should dedicate one's life to this cosmological community by accepting the fate universe has bestowed on one. In world, Marcus Aurelius says, things feed one another, thus, what seems death and destruction is actually just change of one shape of matter into another according to rules and laws of universe. Then again, just like an individual should help the (local or global) community, she should be ready to accept help from others, since a group of persons can achieve things that a single individual by herself couldn't.

Although Marcus Aurelius was a dedicated Stoic, his aphorisms show a bit of carelessness in the acceptance of Stoicism. Thus, he is quite indifferent about the question whether world is governed by a benevolent person or whether Epicureans were right in denying all intention about the behaviour of the world. Whatever the case, Marcus Aurelius says, we should still hold on to our independence and reason.

In a sense, this branch of Stoicism has taken to its inevitable conclusion the idea that philosophy is all about the art of living. This development is in a sense a natural concomitant of the growing independence of other fields of investigation, which is something I'll take a look at in my next post. And when philosophy became synonymous with ethics, it was deprived of all speculations concerning the nature of reality – who cares whether world is ruled by chaos, providence or necessity, as long as I can control myself? Yet, this void of speculation could not be left empty and in yet further posts we will see how philosophy was overtaken by religion.

Philosophy translated

All the philosophers thus far have spoken and written in Greek, even if they lived far away from Greek mainland. Philosophy, as we have faced it – this strange mix of a search for meaningful life and an investigation of truth – has been a unique part of Greek culture. This changed, when philosophical schools started to translate their theories to Rome.

At first, philosophy did not fair well in these new surroundings. There is a well known story of a group of philosophical ambassadors arriving in Rome. Carneades the Academic was one member of this group, and upon the day of their arrival, he made a touching speech about the usefulness of military prowess – a topic close to the heart of Romans. True to his habit of not asserting anything, Carneades made another speech the following day and this time insulted military prowess as the ultimate evil. Needless to say, Roman authorities were not pleased and banned the arrival of philosophers to Rome.

It is not certain how fabulous the story is, but it probably reflects a real tendency in Roman society. Greeks in general were considered effeminate and thus suspicious in the eyes of the masculine culture of Romans. Philosophy was considered nothing more than a further evidence of the perversity of Greeks – who on earth would spend considerable time in thinking such frivolities?

Of course, as time went by, Romans started to warm up to Greek learning. Thus, in few generations we find representatives of major philosophical schools using Latin in their writings. Even such highly infamous school as Epicureanism had its Roman follower, Lucretius. Basic opinions of Lucretius remained same as those of Epicurus, but some interesting differences of emphasis had occurred. While Epicurus himself was against too flowery teaching, Lucretius used his poetic skills for teaching philosophy. Indeed, he concentrated on the most epic theme in Epicurean philosophy, that is, physics or the study of the world and its birth, instead of the usual emphasis on ethical matters.

Lucretius spins a dramatic tale starting from the idea of atoms of different shapes flying around, all in straight line in infinite space. Suddenly, an atom changes its course, due to no reason at all, and bounces on other atoms, thus creating aggregates of atoms, like the elements or earth, water, air and fire. At first the elements are completely mixed, but the heavy earth finally takes up the middle point and the lighter elements are left to the outer remnants. Thus was finally born the world we know, and one day it will be destroyed, when the fight of the elements is finally canceled.

Spirit animating animals and humans is also in Epicurean theory an element consisting of atoms, and furthermore, such that can live only within a body – no afterlife in Epicurean philosophy, but then again, there's also nothing to worry about, no eternal pain after death. True, people do get visions of tormented souls, but these are just freak combinations of atoms striking our mind. In the beginning of the world, the earth itself had enough power to create combinations of spirit and other matter or living beings, but in time its power diminished and only those animals that could have offspring remained. For humans, this meant the beginning of a long progress towards civilization, through inventions like agriculture, metallurgy and social life. But far more important Lucretius considers the discoveries of Epicurus, who showed that many events apparently caused by gods were actually natural occurrences and hence no reason to fear divine wrath.

But it is not Lucretius one should take as the most important link between Greek and Latin philosophy. Instead, this epithet should be bestowed on Marcus Tullius Cicero, who actually began his career as an orator and a statesman in Roman republic and took to philosophy only later in his life, when he was effectively prevented from taking part in state life by machinations of Julius Caesar and his followers. His first literary works concerned rhetoric, a topic he had plenty of personal experience with, and therefore it is no wonder that he took a considerably more positive view of it than many earlier philosophers – rhetoric was a good instrument, if the user just was an upright citizen. Indeed, Cicero was of the opinion that originally rhetoric or oratory formed a complete whole with philosophy, as a general capacity to know how to live and to present one's wisdom to fellow citizens. Later philosophers had isolated some topics for pure research and ignored the need for defending them, and some (Epicureans) had even tried to escape the duty to serve others of their communities in their search for personal peace and contentment. True, philosophers like Stoics might have better arguments, but they lacked the means of making the crowd convinced – a criteria that was essential for evaluating the success of one's speech.

In comparison with philosophers, Cicero thought that orators had nothing to be shamed of. He even suggested that an ideal speaker, like the famous Greek orator, Demosthenes, should know of all sorts of things and be highly civilized. He should be well versed with logic and ethics (for instance, he should know that there are basically two sources of a decent human life: cultivation of one's intellectual capacities and harmonisation of desires under the guidance of intellect). Cicero still admitted that real speakers were often far from this ideal, but maintained that even they had to have some inkling of certain tricks of trade, like some basic human psychology and capacity of finding convincing arguments, even if rhetoric is more dependent on one having the capacities of a potential speaker. Furthermore, Cicero was convinced that oratory as a whole had developed in the sense that best speakers of earlier ages were mere babblers in comparison with best speakers of Cicero's day.

Cicero was in fact convinced that even in philosophy caring about the affairs of community is far more appropriate than losing oneself to the study of the wonders of nature. Indeed, he himself was highly interested of the question of the shape of an ideal community. Cicero basically accepted the Aristotelian idea of three paradigmatic forms of community: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. Of these, democracy does retain the liberty of every citizen, but often leads to a state of anarchy, when no one has a clear governing position, while monarchy and aristocracy are more efficient, but are in danger of being corrupted into tyrannies and oligarchies, just like happened with Roman monarchy. True solution would be a balanced community, with elements of all forms of government, which Cicero felt was embodied in republican Rome, in which consuls retained some of the monarchic power, while patrician senate and plebeian tribunal expressed aristocratic and democratic elements.

Quite traditionally, Cicero held that a balanced community – and indeed, any community, if it was to be community and not just an enslavement of people – would have to be based on justice, that is, on the principle that everyone was due to what she deserved. While Greek philosophers had to apply this principle in affairs of one city, Cicero as a citizen of an empire had to consider what justice means in international affairs. True to the mores of his time, Cicero could defend aggression of a state over another with the Aristotelian notion that some people just were more natural to rule, while the fate of others was to be ruled. Cicero also had to face the problem of different mores in different cultures, so obvious in an international empire like Rome – if different cultures thought different things good and evil, how could we defend justice as the guiding principle of all communities? Cicero's answer was that deep down all people must agree on some basic values, such as justice, because they were based on the nature of things and not on arbitrary cultural habits.

Just like Greek philosophers before him, Cicero was also certain that the good of a community relied not only on the structure of the society, but also on harmonising the actions of the community members. This harmonising then requires that the members have a state of mind geared towards community life, instead of just caring for themselves. As an incentive towards such a mindset, Cicero uses Plato's trick of suggesting a reward in the afterlife for all those who have lived well – a reason not to be intimidated of death nor of old age. Even if death were a mere annihilation of life and so all sensation, it would be nothing to be afraid of, since it would mean deliverance from all pain and would resemble deep sleep. But, Cicero argues, since human body appears to contain a divine element, as evidenced by the mental powers of human beings, this spark must not be hindered by the death of body. Instead, as it is made of finer elements than the coarse body, it will get to fly away from the insignificant speck that Earth is to the beauty of heavenly spheres. Thus, Cicero is willing to incorporate religious rituals to state life and so gain divine justification to it.

Cicero is also insistent that the harmony of the state is dependent especially on the state of its nobles – on the one hand, it's important that there is a class that has the means to understand the affairs of state better than the common people, on the other hand, this class should also work for the common good instead of their own advancement. Cicero especially emphasises the role of past great men of Rome as examples of good life. These past heroes knew that true worth of human life lies not in riches, but more in one's capacity to control oneself – riches and earthly goods are something that comes and goes and a person controlled by a desire for them is never satisfied, while a self-controlled person can never become unhappy, because of his ability to adjust to all circumstances. He would never be anxious or depressed about anything, because he would understand how small and meaningless all the seeming troubles of life are.

These statements of what good life is sound like they could have come out of the mouth of a Stoic. Indeed, like Stoics, Cicero was critical of the Epicurean philosophy. Epicurean physics Cicero despised completely. Atoms changing the direction of their movement just by accidence and complete worlds coming to be through pure chance were just too unbelievable doctrines in his eyes. And images of things far away floating around, pinging our bodies and causing us imagine things not actually present sounds convincing at first, but then you'd have to accept the existence of all sorts of fables, like centaurs and dragons.

Epicurean idea of gods Cicero thought especially ridiculous. Epicureans thought a god should be human in shape, because that was the only suitable form for reasoning, but this just made human ignorance into a general principle – and in any case, how could a thing in human form be anything but mortal? Furthermore, Epicureans thought that gods would do nothing and care for nothing and still be happy, but Cicero insisted that only an active life would be a happy life. Even worse, idea of such indifferent gods would mean end to all religion, because no one would feel any need to worship such gods. In any case, Cicero thought that it would have been easier if Epicureans had just denied the existence of gods altogether, since they just appeared to accept them because of common opinion.

Cicero had learned from Epicurean teachers and so knew more of their ethics than just the usual caricature – he was aware that Epicureans did not search for mere temporary delights of flesh, but like other major schools of philosophy, recommended a life of moderation, because only such promised stable pleasures. Yet, Cicero thought, Epicurus was trying to play with two sets of cards at the same time: on the one hand, he spoke of pleasure to entice people wanting to spend their life full of a variety of pleasant sensations, on the other hand, he acted as if greatest pleasure was just a life without pain in order to sound more respectable in philosophical circles. Epicurus even says that traditional virtues are good for pleasures (for instance, courage makes us feel less pain in adverse circumstances), but Cicero thinks this view distorts the true purpose of virtues, which are meant to serve the whole community, not just an individual. Indeed, a true Epicurean would be a complete egoist, and because Epicurus himself valued his friends, he must have been inconsistent.

Even though Cicero did agree with Stoics that Epicureans were a really bad school of philosophy and even used their terminology in a Latinized form, he still was no straightforward Stoic, but appropriated features of many philosophies into his worldview. Indeed, he didn't have a high opinion of Stoic logic or Stoic ideas of the natural world, thinking that Stoics had merely copied the ideas of their predecessors and in some cases had even regressed. At some point, Cicero especially criticized their ethics, which attempted to state paradoxical conclusions, such as the indifference of all except virtuous behaviour, but had to admit, like Platonists and Aristotelians had done earlier, that even Stoics thought it preferable to be healthy and of good means – in effect Cicero accused Stoics of using terminological quibbles to distinguish themselves from more adequate philosophers.

Cicero was especially interested of the New Academy, and like them, accepted that humans can usually achieve only probability, not true knowledge – at least if knowledge is defined in the manner Stoics had. The basis of all knowledge should be perceptions that accurately portray things they appear to present, Stoics say, but there is no way to discern such true perceptions from mere appearances, which might look essentially same as true perceptions. This doesn't mean that one should be completely blind about how to conduct one's live, Cicero says, because probability is enough for a decent life – indeed, even Stoics must admit that most people must do with mere probability, because knowledge is so rare.

Still, even in case of conduct Cicero finds at first that opinions of Plato and Aristotle were far more probable than Stoicism – Plato and Aristotle at least straightforwardly admitted that material things are goods and part of a happy life, they just weren't as good as mental fortitude. Stoics announced that pain was no evil, but such a statement would not help anything when one was actually feeling it. Far better in Cicero's opinion was to teach one to tolerate pain, just like a manly man can do – and if pain turns too strong to bear, there's always the possibility to escape to the netherworld. And while Stoics were satisfied to say that wise men never felt any distress, because they saw how unreasonable it is, this helps in no manner anyone wallowing in grief who does not fulfill the ideal of Stoic sage – instead, they should be led to reflect on the cause of their grief and note themselves its insignificance.

Yet, Cicero wouldn't have been a true Academician, if he couldn't have seen the other side of the debate also. While Aristotle was to be recommended for realizing the importance of sensuous goods and pains, Cicero was highly critical of his idea of best life being a sort of mean between two extremes. If someone was, say, even the slightest bit agitated out of anger, he might well be overwhelmed, if the emotion rose to a higher degree. Far better it would be, Cicero thought, to follow the Stoic ideal, in which all emotions should fall under perfect control of a person. Indeed, if even Epicureans, who laid all happiness in pleasure, said that a true philosopher was always happy and not shaken by anything, shouldn't disciples of Socrates be equally capable?

Similarly ambivalent was Cicero's attitude towards Stoic doctrine of gods. He did find appealing the idea of gods governing the world and taking care of human affairs. Yet, he found some severe inconsistencies in the Stoic teachings, arising mostly from their attempt, on the one hand, to base their notions of gods in clear reasoning, and on the other hand, to accommodate common notions of divinities. Even this dual attempt itself seems rather suspect in Cicero's eyes, since to rely on the ideas of common people e.g. in matters of divine existence appears so unphilosophical. Furthermore, to allow at least some gods of tradition into a philosophical system opens up a can of worms. Where to stop? Why accept only these gods and not all of those lesser demons? And why just Greek and Latin gods and not also gods of other people? In addition, as Greco-Roman religion had no accepted consensus on the different origin stories and genealogies of the gods, one could not form a consistent pantheon around them.

Even if Stoics would disentangle their view of gods from the common conceptions, it would face grave difficulties. Stoics thought that the ultimate god must be the whole world itself, since there can not be anything greater than world – world must, for instance, live and think, because it contains parts that live and think. Yet, Cicero noted, this type of reasoning is just false. A city or a nation is clearly greater than the individuals that constitute it, but still we do not admit that cities or nations would live or think. Cicero also noted that how hard it was to believe that this Stoic world god controlled all its parts perfectly and that it had arranged all the parts of the world and even human affairs as well as it could be. World god had given reason to humans, but these then went on to use it for all sorts of evil deeds – why not make humans good at the same time?

Cicero was particularly critical of the Stoic acceptance of divination. Firstly, Cicero thought that divination was either impossible or futile. Either there are things that happen by chance and then divination cannot happen, or then all events occur with utmost necessity and then it makes no sense to e.g. know of any future dangers, since one cannot avoid them in any manner. Furthermore, Cicero found all alleged instances of divination rather unconvincing. True, sometimes diviners and fortune tellers did make correct predictions, but at least as often they were completely wrong. One couldn't argue for divination from the acceptance of predictions of doctors, which also might go wrong sometimes, because doctors could rely on their knowledge of natural processes, while diviners could not really explain the mechanism by which the divination was supposed to work. Indeed, one could often hear one diviner interpreting some dream or other sign in a completely opposite way as another diviner – so flimsy is the connection between the supposed sign from gods and its meaning. One might even ask if it is unbecoming to gods to present their messages so unclearly.

In fact, Cicero was rather skeptical of the whole Stoic notion of an unyielding fate controlling everything that happens in the world. Clear problem such a fatalism was, because it appeared to cancel all possibility of humans freely choosing their actions. Cicero then suggested that one might instead accept the possibility of free actions and hence deny outright fatalism.

Cicero did not remain satisfied with mere criticism of famous schools of philosophy, but also developed his own stance on how one should live, in his last published book on duties. The first and foremost question in Cicero's eyes is what makes human life, not just distinct from, but also better than mere animal life. Cicero suggests rather traditionally that it is the human desire to know things that separates us from beasts and that should therefore be cultivated in greatest measure.

Yet, Cicero was no advocate of the ideal of a hermit philosopher, as we have clearly seen in his appraisal of community life. Indeed, as human community is based on such matters like communication, it is something that prominently separates us from beasts. Cicero thinks that nature has given for human beings an instinct to contact their fellows and make bonds with them, and this instinct should be followed – one should communicate with one's relatives, but also with friends and generally everyone in our community. Thus, people who shy away from communal life, because of their own interests, fail to do what they should, and even worse are people, like Caesar, who work actively against common interest, because of their own ambitions.

Respect for the communal life gives then various particular rules for people to follow, such as: we should respect the rights of other people for their own property, but we should also be willing to part of our own property for the benefit of others in our community. Yet, Cicero is not willing to give any definite rules, since in some cases we must break rules in order to avoid greater evil, just as when we must break a promise if obeying it would actually do more harm.

Furthermore, even though we should try to advance the interests of our own community, we should still also not do anything immoral against other communities, such as starting an unprovoked war against them. Indeed, one should show respect even to one's enemies and to one's servants and slaves, if one is to be a truly good person, Cicero continues.

Like many thinkers before him, Cicero considered masculine ideal of brave and unrelenting warrior, who despises all hardships and pains, to be worthy of following, although, again just like many previous thinkers, he would consider it a good thing only in service of the community. Furthermore, Cicero would note that such a courageous and stolid attitude could be shown even at times of peace, especially in political arena.

Search for knowledge, acknowledgment of the importance of social relations and a manly behaviour are for Cicero important ingredients of good human life, but in addition, one must also show a certain finesse in behaviour that is not easy to put in definite rules. One important element in Cicero's ideal is self-control – one should not be carried away by pleasures of senses or mind, whether it be wine or good humour, and especially one should shy away from things considered indecent by the community. Then again, this behavioural finesse requires also a possession of a clear character that one must follow – one must be oneself and act according to one's station in life. Here belong questions like what it is proper for one to wear and what kind of professions one should pursue. In these questions the social relations are also important, since one learns these unspoken rules of conduct by observing the behaviour of one's fellow citizens and especially of those considered to be especially good examples.

In addition to the question of how one should live one's life, Cicero also considers the question what is of benefit to a person. He suggests that while many things do help us, like the inanimate and animate goods of nature, it is especially other human beings who are of use to us, especially as many of the goods of nature must be first cultivated by humans. Of course, humans can also be of the greatest disadvantage to one another, but this just means that we should spend most of our time to get others co-operate with us. Indeed, in this sense the most advantageous way of life is just the one described above, in which one tries to live in service of one's community.

True to this opinion, Cicero did not allow any real conflict exist between the demands of how one should live and demands of what is truly advantageous: he thus finally accepts the Stoic position. One must think of one's friends, before trying to gain more wealth or power to oneself, and one must think of one's community, before helping one's friends. This still does not mean that one's duty would be always straightforward. For instance, we usually must keep our promises, but there appears to be cases where promises must be broken, such as when someone's life depends on it – here, one duty is cancelled by a higher duty. Cicero even notes that commitments to one's community might be overridden, if the community at stake uses perverted means to improve its positions, such as when it wages an unjust war against an innocent opponent. Thus, Cicero overcomes the restricted patriotism of a Roman gentleman and achieves a more cosmopolitan stand toward questions of politics.

Against dogmas

Until now, the philosophers we have studied have tried to establish their opinions as more or less certain truths, in other words, they have held on to some dogmas they have believed in. We have also seen philosophers attacking opinions of other philosophers and trying to find weaknesses in them. Yet, the end of such arguments has always been establishing the truth of one's own opinions. Still, one might suppose that some philosophers would merely argue against opinions of others and delight in finding holes in theories and still not teach any credo of their own.

We find such an attitude in some Greek physicians. Medicine in general had had a sort of rivalry with philosophy: both physicians and philosophers were sure they could improve people's lives. Of course, some physicians endorsed philosophical theories of the constitution of humans and based their practice on them. Yet, others of the so-called empirical school thought such theories were always untrustworthy, and instead, based their practice on immediate observations: if this substance appears to make this patient feel better, we should probably make him take it more.

In philosophy, the first clear sign of such a dominant use of criticism had been Socrates' habit of questioning his fellow citizens, although even he was probably trying to get them admit some moral truths. Use of Socratic dialogue was continued in Plato's school, although more as a method for educating young students, while Plato and his immediate followers undoubtedly held on to some dogmas. Still, in course of time, the Socratic method actually overthrew Platonic dogma from its place of honour in Platonic Academy.

The beginner of this trend was Arcesilaus, who was fond of showing that no dogma of other philosophical schools was more believable than a contrary dogma: indeed, he apparently taught that no assertion was to be believed. His opponents and especially Stoics doubted that such a life would be even possible, because believing something was so ingrained in human mind. Arcesilaus answered that one might still use what is reasonable as guidance in life.

An even later teacher of Academy, Carneades, countered the Stoic doubt that instead of firm assertion one could base one's life on plausibilities. Thus, one need not believe in a single sensation, but if it happens to cohere with many other sensations, it might still be recommendable to live as if this sensation was really true. If we ignore external appearances, Carneades' view was actually not that far from official Stoic doctrine: in place of firm truth one could just put high probability. It is therefore not that surprising that later Academicians moved closer to the position of Stoics.

The true embodiment of the critical attitude was the Sceptic or Pyrrhonian school, named after its founder. Pyrrho was famous of doubting everything, even what he saw in front of him, and his opponents told stories of Pyrrho being saved by his followers from dangers he just couldn't accept as true. Pyrrho had only few followers, most notable of them being Timon, famous for poems making fun of all the other philosophers. Later, Pyrrhonian school became to have some affinities with the empirical school of medicine, as evidenced by the name and the testimony of Pyrrhonian with most surviving writings, Sextus Empiricus.

Pyrrhonians shared some methodological points with Academy of Arcesilaus and Carneades. Most importantly, both schools showed that every belief could be countered by another plausible belief. Thus, what one sensed could be countered by other sensations – like tower could seem round and angular from different directions – or by theories – like white could be said to actually be multi-coloured, and similarly theories could be countered by sensations or by other theories.

While Academics were quick to conclude that no assertions should be believed in, Pyrrhonians thought this was contradictory, because it would mean believing in this demand of non-belief. Instead, Pyrrhonians couldn't even decide whether something should be believed in or not.

Seemingly out of all options, Pyrrhonians explained that in addition to conscious choice of holding on to some assertion, people were forced to choose things according to what things seemed to be: thus, when I feel hungry, I am forced to find food, although there might be no guarantee that I am actually in need of nourishment. Similarly, Pyrrhonians suggested, when two opinions appear to be equally plausible, we are forced to suspend our beliefs concerning them altogether. Still, the possibility that either one of the opinions was the correct one still remains.

Just like Academics, Pyrrhonians faced the problem how one could live in such a state of non-belief. While Carneades had relied on the notion of plausibility, Pyrrhonians thought that it was enough to rely on what thing appeared to be and what these appearances forced us to do, just like in the case of hunger and accompanying desire for eating.

Pyrrhonian Aenesidemus was famous for inventing general argument schemes by which all sorts of opinions could be attacked. His general method was to note that we could always view things only from some perspective or context and by changing this context the opinions would also have to change. This relativity or perspectiveness could be caused by the peculiar nature of the one holding the opinion. Thus, different animals sense and think of things differently, and we have no right to hold one species to have a more perfect view of the world than others. Even if we could somehow hold humans as the species with best cognitive apparatus, humans themselves would still have different constitutions and would view things differently. Even if we then could pick out some person as truly wise, she would still feel things differently with different senses: something that would look pleasant could taste horrible. Furthermore, she would see things differently under different conditions, e.g. as young she hears things that she couldn't hear while old.

In addition to the person holding opinion, the things that the opinion should be about cause also differences of opinions when they are changed. Thus, quantity of things affects how we view it: drinking a glass of water is refreshing, drinking whole ocean is deadly. A peculiar case is formed by laws and customs, which differ from place to place and engender different views about the good life.

Finally, the variablity of perspectives could also be caused by the interaction between those who investigated things and those who are being investigated. Thus, even the relative locations of the observer and the observed could make a great difference, because things look different from different angles and distances or when observed in water and out of water. Furthermore, if something is novel to the observer, it will seem more or less different from what a familiar object feels like.

An even simpler and more effective set of arguments was invented by a later Pyrrhonian, Agrippa. His starting point is familiar: there are many contradicting opinions and they all seem to be just a matter of perspective. It is when someone attempts to present an opinion as something more than mere opinion that Agrippa's arguments really begin. If something is just supposed as convincing in itself, then the opponent has an equal right to suppose her option. If then one attempts to base this supposition on something, it will have to be based on something similar or something different. If you base it on something similar, you face the same questions again and at most you can set up a never-ending search for foundation. If you base it on something different, you still have to find some base for this new supposition and you then also have the same two choices: basing it on something similar falls again to the problem of never-ending search, while always trying to base suppositions on something different will eventually go through all possible options and create a loop that itself is not based on anything. The end of the story is that nothing can be supposed without begging the question.

Pyrrhonians also insisted that there appeared to be nothing that could be taught. Either we would be taught all the things that do not exist – but this is absurd – or then we would be taught all the things that exist – but this is equally impossible, because we couldn't start anywhere, if everything had to be taught to us. Furthermore, what was taught isn't corporeal, because bodies are not thoughts, while it is uncertain if there are any incorporeal things.

Then again, Pyrrhonians continued, it was doubtful that there were any experts good enough to teach anything – and non-experts clearly aren't able to teach anything. Furthermore, even learning appeared to be impossible: experts couldn't learn anything anymore, while non-experts couldn't even recognise when they have learned something.

Finally, Pyrrhonians stated that there was no proper method to teach anything. If you just showed things to a pupil, he would just pick up what evidently appeared to him and not learn anything new. Speech, on the other hand, couldn't be used to teach anything, because one would already have to know what the words meant, if he was to learn anything – and if she knew what they meant, then she wouldn't need anyone to teach them more.

Armed with such strong arguments, Pyrrhonians could have just rested on their laurels and declared all attempts to find knowledge futile. Instead, they went to quite some length in order to discredit even individual disciplines. They began with the traditional Greek elementary studies, in order to show that knowledge could not be found even in such elementary topics.

First of the elementary studies skeptics rejected was the learning of grammar and classic literature. Sextus noted that learning grammar was not altogether useless, because reading and writing were important for surviving in the real life. It is the supposedly expert part of it, dealing with intricacies of language that is both useless and doubtful. An expert of language begins by defining its elements or individual sounds, but it is problematic to even decide what is an individual sound. Is a long vowel a separate sound from a short vowel or just two vowels put together? Is a differently pronounced s a new sound or a combination of s with some other sound? Written language is of no help here, because it is far from being consistent and in some cases it accepts such as different elements and uses a different letter for them, but in other cases it uses a combination of several letters.

Combining sounds into syllables and words is also problematic, because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish combinations of several syllables or words from a single syllable or word. Even more inconsistencies are produced by grammatical genera of words, especially if they are defined as masculine or feminine. If the experts of language try to make the linguistic inconsistencies disappear by making all conjugations and such bound to a rule, the problem is which rule one should follow in unclear cases. The only sufficient criterion appears to be the actual language use of different people, but this requires no expertise and would also mean acceptance of all inconsistencies. If the experts would want to revert to some original state of language, they couldn't explain what was better in such archaic forms – if they were natural, everyone would use them.

The teachers of grammar also boasted of knowledge of myths and ancient poets, but this did not impress skeptics. Because myths and poems are so variable and have different version, there can be no systematic discipline studying them. Furthermore, trying to find great wisdom in such works of art is futile, because these works are so inconsistent in their teachings: should we follow the advice of one character or of another?

After grammar, it was rhetoric that faced the skeptic attack. Sextus ridiculed teachers of fine speeches who rarely made speeches themselves, and noted that floral expressions of famous orators rarely received any sympathies from listeners and judges of court anymore and thus failed to convince or impress, which supposedly was the major achievement of this art. In addition, he noted that a community would not benefit from people who could lull others with pretty words, thus making the status of rhetoric as a useful art suspect.

Even mathematical arts weren't left in peace, at least if they passed the limits of what was required in everyday life. Pyrrhonians criticized the notion of points as dimensionless entities, out of which were generated breadthless lines, depthless planes and finally normal bodies. All that we see, they say, has some dimensions, has breadth and even depth, so we truly have no reason to suppose the existence of such non-entities like points, lines and planes. Furthermore, even if such incorporeal entities existed, it would be mysterious how they could produce corporeal bodies or even limit them.

Equally suspect in Pyrrhonians' opinions was the attempt to base arithmetic on the philosophical notion of One as something that made all things into unities. Was this One itself a unity? Wouldn't it then make all the unities into just one entity, thus making it impossible to count anything. And if it was more like a material that could be divided and attached to each unity separately, how could we speak of the One as a unified entity?

It was not practical land measuring and counting that Pyrrhonians criticized, but theories supposedly meant as their foundations. Similarly, they were not antagonistic towards empirical study of stars and their movements, but towards the attempt to read people's destinies from the position of the stars at the time of their conception or birth. Pyrrhonians noted that even if stars do influence human lives, such studies would have to be of utmost accuracy, because clearly there have been persons born very close and very near one another and still with quite remote destinies. Then again, such accuracy is impossible to maintain, because it is too difficult to determine the exact point at which a child has been born or conceived.

The final part of traditional Greek education or music was also argued against by Pyrrhonians. While music was usually hailed as necessary for cultivating human character, Pyrrhonians noted that in many cases music appeared to have quite the opposite effect and that its apparent good consequences were caused by its capacity to captivate its listeners. Furthermore, musical education appeared useless to Pyrrhonians, because even small babies could appreciate good music. Finally, Pyrrhonians attacked the whole notions of a systematic study of music, because it consisted of fleeting melodies, which had no stable structure to be investigated.

Pyrrhonians continued on to argue against the more refined philosophical disciplines. In the order of presentation, they mostly followed Stoics, probably because it was the most famed school at the time. Thus, like Stoics, they began with logic, but instead of showing how one can find what is true, they presented arguments against the possibility to find truth. The other schools had supposed there had to be some group of entities that were able to decide what is true or not: most of them had supposed this group contained at least some humans. Now, Pyrrhonians noted that even recognising someone as a human would require a commonly accepted definition of humanity, which no one had yet given. Indeed, because no one had satisfyingly discerned the generally supposed constituent aspects of humans, that is, material bodies and mental life, there was no reason to assume a combination of these aspects was any more understandable.

Even if we could discern humans from other entities, Pyrrhonians continued, we still could not accept that humans would be able to know the truth, unless someone who knew truth confirmed it – thus, another regress was generated. Further problems were created by the diversity of human opinions – surely not humans with all their disputes could all be truth recognisers.

If humans or at least some of them were still accepted as capable of knowing the truth, Pyrrhonians could always move on to study the tools by which a human being knows something. Of these tools, sensations clearly contradict themselves from time to time, while intellect is somewhat fuzzy entity, of which nothing much is known for certain – and even we just accepted it, as it is, different people would appear to have been lead to different opinions by their intellects. The only option would then be to let senses and intellect cooperate, but even this cooperation would be useless, because neither could be used as a final standard in cases where the senses and intellect disagreed.

Finally, Pyrrhonians doubted the veracity of the idea that what appeared to us human beings through either senses or intellect could be used in discerning truth. Indeed, they said, it is unclear what these appearances are and how they are produced, so there is nothing to indicate that they have any connection with truth. Indeed, it appears that appearances tell more of the internal states of human beings than of any external objects. We couldn't even say that appearances are similar to the objects, because we cannot have any direct view of the objects. And in fact, while appearances contradict one another, there is no standard for deciding which of them are true.

Pyrrhonians went even further and even suspected the very existence of truths. Truths appeared to be something beyond mere perception, because truth is not a thing that we could literally see. Truth also doesn't appear to be a linguistic attribute of statements, because statements as temporal processes come and go and then truth would also vanish after the statement has been uttered. Then again, if truth was just something in our thoughts, then no things we perceive would be true, which would appear strange.

Even more problems arose from the attempts to know something mediately, through signs or symbols, just like fire might be recognised through rising smoke. Sign apparently must then be immediately apparent and clear – otherwise we couldn't know of it – while that which is known through a sign must be hidden and unclear – otherwise there wouldn't be any need to use sign. Problem is, we couldn't know that A is a sign of B, because we wouldn't be aware of the B at all. Furthermore, it is problematic whether knowing something as a sign requires only perception or also thought. If it would require mere perception, it would be unclear how people conceive different causes for certain signs, for instance, two doctors who make different diagnose from same symptoms. Then again, it cannot require thinking, because even dogs can use signs like smells for information gathering.

An important subspecies of sign use that Pyrrhonians also attacked was demonstrations, which derived formerly unknown truths from known truths. Their main point was that all apparently valid conclusions were either useless or inconclusive. Consider, for instance, a proof of the form ”A, if A then B, thus B”. Here the statement ”if A, then B” is actually quite problematic. You cannot really know it is true, unless you have gone through all known cases where the statement A holds. But if you have done this, then you already know directly that B is also true at this time, so the whole deduction is pointless. If, on the other hand, you don't know whether ”if A then B” is true, you cannot prove B through this argument. Weaker inductive proofs fare even worse, because one could not generalise from a single observation. Indeed, Pyrrhonians noted that logicians were not even better in choosing what arguments to follow than real experts: for instance, a doctor might know instinctually that certain prescription was not made right, while logician would have nothing to add to this.

Pyrrhonians also spoke against the need to define things precisely. Indeed, because definitions couldn't be made infinitely big, there should be some ultimate undefined terms, thus showing that skill of defining things is not always useful. Indeed, many definitions made things even more obscure by replacing fairly well known terms with further murkiness. Finally, Pyrrhonians ridiculed the division of classes – if we cannot even know what these classes are, we cannot really say the division is complete.

In physical matters Pyrrhonians could easily refer to the variety of opinions held by different schools, yet, they took pains in finding arguments against certain common opinions. Thus, when Stoics tried to argue that physical matters could be explained by active causes interacting with passive materials, Pyrrhonians raised doubts against both of them. The ultimate active cause was often said to be some god or gods, but Pyrrhonians could also easily bring forward philosophers doubting and even ridiculing the idea of the existence of gods. For instance, god would have to be either motionless and even incapable of motion – rather pathetic god – or else it would love and thus be susceptible to corruption. This point resembles a basic contradiction in the very notion of divinity: gods were thought to be good and powerful, but still they either couldn't manage or wouldn't want to relief the world of all the suffering. Paradoxically, Pyrrhonians thought that this lack of definite conclusion was actually best thing that happened from a religious viewpoint. If no conclusion was certain, then one should just continue following traditional worship just in case. Those who wanted to prove the existence of gods, on the other hand, made religion susceptible to ridicule by blasphemous counterarguments.

In addition to gods, all active causes are actually suspect, Pyrrhonians suggested. Firstly, we couldn't even conceive what causes are, because knowing a cause would presuppose knowing its effects, which would then presuppose knowing their cause. Even if one could know what causes are, she would have to give a cause that would guarantee that there are causes: this would lead to a never-ending series of causes. Finally, it is actually in most cases even impossible to distinguish between the active and the passive components of causal relation. For instance, when sun, say, dries a piece of clay, sun is not the only active thing, because the clay itself is acting to allow the drying – if it would be snow, the result would be quite the contrary, that is, a wet spot.

Furthermore, Pyrrhonians thought the very process of causation to be dubious. Presumably causes either added something to things or took away from them. Now, such an interaction would in most likelihood occur either between two bodies or two non-bodily limits of things, like lines, because it would be difficult to say how e.g. lines could add anything to bodies. Line then apparently could in a sense take away something from another line, for instance, when one line cut another in two. Then again, the very notion of such splitting of lines was very awkward. If a line could be cut in two, then its parts would have to have been joined by a point, which the cutting line would then go through. But where would this middle point then belong? It could not belong to both parts, or they would still be joined, but if it belonged to either, the line would not be cut evenly, and if it belonged to neither, the line would have been cut into three parts. Similar problems would be faced with combining lines and other limits of bodies.

The notion of bodies interacting with one another is equally difficult, Pyrrhonians continued. Suppose a smaller body is added to another. If the smaller body truly changed the essence of the larger body, it would make this other body similar to itself – namely, smaller. Addition would then actually diminish a thing, which would be absurd. If the smaller body, on the contrary, would not affect the essence of the other body, it would not really add anything to the other body, but would only come in close contact with it.

In addition to causes, the very things that causes act on are suspect, Pyrrhonians continue. Most of the philosophical schools assume that there are material objects or bodies that can be described through geometrical means. Yet, in order to account for three-dimensional bodies geometrically, one must regard them as formed from two-dimensional surfaces and finally from one-dimensional lines – problem is that we can see no such two- or one-dimensional things flying around anywhere. Furthermore, it is a mystery how concrete bodies can be thought about reliably. If we could do it, such thoughts would have to be based on prior perceptions of bodies, but it seems that we perceive only fragments of these bodies – we see colours, we smell certain odours, but our perceptions do not tell us that these colours and odours go together. Because we cannot directly perceive all such properties as belonging to one thing, we cannot even think about such belonging.

This still leaves the possibility that there could be incorporeal substances that could be affected by some causes. Problem is that we seem to be unable to define incorporeal substances without any reference to the corporeal substances, which were already deemed problematic. In addition, incorporeal substances cannot be perceived to exist, because they cannot exert any influence on our sense organs. Furthermore, their existence cannot even be argued for, because arguments definitely are not corporeal, so we would have to decide first whether there are incorporeal things, before we could just assume the existence of incorporeal substances.

In addition to the general attack against incorporeal substances, Pyrrhonians also went against some particular types of such substances, such as place and time. Of these two, place cannot be material, because then it would repel bodies, but it cannot also be a void, because then it would vanish, whenever occupied by a body. Time, on the other hand, consists of a part that is not yet, a part that is yet to come and of a fleeting limit between the two – how could it exist? But if place and time do not exist, how could there be any motion, or indeed, change in general and thus anything for physics to study? Then again, motion and change are so natural concepts that defending them requires just reference to common experiences. Because there are good reasons both for accepting them and for disregarding them, Pyrrhonians concluded that we should just refrain to say anything about them.

After physics, Pyrrhonians set their sights on ethical questions. Here they could easily refer to the various opinions and customs in different cultures and with different thinkers, so that any supposed taboo was practiced or at least allowed by some people: for instance, some of the early Stoics had seen nothing bad in eating human flesh. Hence, Pyrrhonists concluded, nothing was naturally good or bad, for otherwise everyone would think it good or bad.

Furthermore, Pyrrhonists denied that anyone could really be an expert of how to live. This couldn't be a natural trick, because then everyone would know it by instinct and need no philosophers to guide them, but learning how to live was as impossible as learning in general. Furthermore, philosophers are often in awe of the idea of a truly good person, but Pyrrhonians noted that such people are usually like nothing when compared with even better persons. Finally, supposed experts of good life lived actually rather poor lives full of all sorts of hardship.

In fact, skeptics appeared to live much calmer lives than their dogmatic fellows, Pyrrhonians thought. Latter had all sorts of beliefs about what is good and what is bad and then spent all their life craving for what is good and fearing for what is bad, thus making their life full of woe and misery. Pyrrhonians, on the other hand, had no opinions about the matter and were thus hurt only by such unavoidable physical feelings like hunger.